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Symposium
GIDEON-A GENERATION LATER
INTRODUCTION & KEYNOTE SPEAKERs
DEAN DONALD GIFFoRu
Good Morning. I'm Don Gifford. I'm the Dean of the University
of Maryland Law School, and it's my privilege this morning on behalf
of the law school community to welcome you to Westminster Hall, to
the Law School, and to this Symposium: Gideon v. Wainwight, 1-A
Generation Later. The beginning of the story goes like this .... "In
the morning of January 8, 1962, the Supreme Court of the United
States received a large envelope from Clarence Earl Gideon, prisoner
No. 003826, Florida State Prison, P.O. Box 221, Raiford, Florida. '2
This is the beginning of the story; this is the first sentence of Anthony
Lewis's award winning book, Gideon's Trumpet. But how the story ends,
we still do not know and perhaps we'll never know. To declare a legal
right is one thing. To enact it in a meaningful way is quite another.
So the purpose of this Symposium over the next day or two is to look
at this issue. How real are the rights articulated in Gideon v. Wain-
wright? How far have we come? How much further do we have to go?
We thank you all for joining with us and taking time from your busy
schedules as professors, as judges, as practitioners to help us answer
these questions. I do want to begin, as is customary, by thanking the
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). [All footnotes have been added by editors of the Maryland
Law Review. In conformity with the oral character of the speeches, footnotes have been
kept to a minimum. Occasional lapses and inaudible portions in the recording of the
speeches have made a perfectly verbatim transcription impossible. Such omissions are not
indicated in the text. The text has been edited in a few places.-eds.].
2. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 3 (1964).
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co-sponsors of this Symposium. First of all Clarence Earl Gideon won
in the Supreme Court not only because he was right, but because he
was represented by some of the world's best lawyers. And those law-
yers happened to work at a firm where public service and pro-bono ac-
tivities were deeply valued. That tradition continues today at the law
firm of Arnold & Porter. So as they say on public television and public
radio: "This program has been made possible by a grant from the law
firm of Arnold & Porter." I want to thank Abe Krash for that as well as
for being here. I also want to thank University of Maryland Law
School graduate Steve Lockman for facilitating this generous gift.
This Symposium is also sponsored by the Gerber Memorial Lecture
Fund here at the University of Maryland School of Law, named for
three members of the Gerber family, including our graduate Lloyd
Gerber. Now symposia such as this don't just happen. This Sympo-
sium was conceived and has been executed by Professor Doug Colbert
of the University of Maryland Law School Faculty. I would suggest to
you that the fact that the indigent defendant's right to counsel has not
yet been fully implemented has become something of a mission, no,
probably an obsession, with Professor Colbert over the last several
years. He has worked with his students in the clinical program. He
has worked with the Maryland State Bar Association and with the
American Bar Association. He frequently has had appearances on ra-
dio talk shows. If you will spare a proud law school dean a small indul-
gence, I will tell you that eleven days from now the Maryland Bar
Foundation will bestow upon Doug the Seventh Annual Legal Excel-
lence Award for the Advancement of Unpopular Causes. So join with
me in thanking Doug and also in congratulating him for the award he
is about to receive.
The papers and remarks of this Symposium will be carried in the
Maryland Law Review. I want to thank our Editor in Chief of the Mary-
land Law Review, Abby Ross, and also particularly Joe Key of the Law
Review for all of their hard work in helping Professor Colbert put this
conference together.
Many of you have traveled far. We would like to make you wel-
come in whatever way is possible. I know that it's tough to believe, but
on a Friday or Saturday it is probably even possible that we would find
a faculty office where you could make a telephone call or two. So let
us know if we can help you out in any way, shape, or form.
If you're going to begin a conference on Gideon v. Wainwright-A
Generation Later, there are two people that you would want to begin
with. We are very proud to have both of them with us this morning.
Introducing Anthony Lewis is a very personal thing for me. In 1965,
1334 [VOL. 58:1333
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as an eighth grader in rural Ohio who had never had any connection
to the legal system, I picked up a book at the local public library. It
was Gideon's Trumpet. At the end of that book I knew that I wanted to
be a lawyer. About a dozen years later, however, I remember cursing
that I had read the book because one February morning when it was
twenty degrees below zero in rural Ohio, one of my court appointed
defendants took a sheriff's deputy hostage at gun point and would
only negotiate through me, his attorney. So every story has a flip side,
Mr. Lewis.
Anthony Lewis, of course, is a columnist with The New York Times.
He has twice won the Pulitzer Prize. He began with The Times in 1948.
He began covering the Supreme Court and other related legal matters
in 1958. He went on to write two other books, one about New York
Times v. Sullivan,' the other about the civil rights movement.4 We wel-
come you Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Lewis is joined this morning by Mr. Abe Krash of the law firm
Arnold & Porter. Over the last several afternoons we have been play-
ing to our students the film version of Gideon's Trumpet. There are
scenes in the movie in which Abe Fortas and Abe Krash are putting
together the briefs and talking strategy. I overheard one of our stu-
dents saying to another student, while pointing to the person playing
Mr. Krash in the movie, "He's the brains of the outfit, and he's going
to be here on Friday morning." Now if you think about that for just a
moment, Justice Fortas was arguably the most intelligent member ever
to serve on the United States Supreme Court. For Abe Krash to be
compared with Abe Fortas, and to be called the "brains of the outfit"
is really quite a compliment. (We might note also that the law clerk
who worked on the brief wasn't bad either. It was John Hart Ely who
went on to teach constitutional law at Harvard, and then to become
the Dean of Stanford Law School.) Mr. Krash is a graduate of the
University of Chicago Law School and for many years has been a visit-
ing lecturer at both Georgetown and Yale. So please join with me this
morning in welcoming to the University of Maryland School of Law
Mr. Anthony Lewis and Mr. Abe Krash.
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAw: THE Sullivan Case and
the First Amendment (1991).
4. ANTHONY LEWIS, Forward to THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT
WASN'T (Vincent Blasi, ed. 1983).
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ANTHONY LEWIS
Dean, I like the story about the rural life in Ohio. Thank you.
Ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to be taking part in
this Symposium. The issue to be discussed, the right to counsel, is one
of profound importance, not just to those charged with crime, but to
all of us as a sign and symbol of the kind of society we are. I have a
personal reason to be grateful for having been invited here. The occa-
sion brings me together again with Abe Krash. I have to say, having
heard the Dean, that I think it's lucky that Abe Fortas never heard you
described as the brains of the outfit.
We were in at the beginning of the Gideon story, he as a lawyer, I
as a journalist. We were a bit younger then-it was 1962. But I don't
think either of us has lost his sense of what justice and decency re-
quire on this question. To most Americans it must seem an easy and
obvious question. Do you need a lawyer when you face a criminal
charge? Of course you do. If you are too poor to hire one must the
government provide you with a lawyer? Surely. So most people as-
sumed when the Gideon case came along, but the assumption was false.
The Supreme Court had held in 1938 that in federal prosecutions the
Sixth Amendment provision that the accused shall enjoy the right to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense required the provision
of counsel for poor defendants. But in 1942 in the case of Betts v.
Brady'-all of you who know the law, and maybe that's all of you, real-
ize that I'm going over well-trodden ground-the Court declined to
apply the same rule in state prosecutions. History drew that distinc-
tion in the application of the Constitution to the federal government
and the states. The first ten amendments to the Constitution, The Bill
of Rights, limited only the power of the federal government. But
gradually, over many years, the Supreme Court held that the funda-
mental guarantees of the Bill of Rights were applied to the states by
the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that "[n]o State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."6 In the 1960s under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held
that most of the guarantees of fair criminal procedure in the Bill of
Rights applied to the states.7 The rule against double jeopardy,' for
example, the requirement that no one be compelled to incriminate
5. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overnded by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1994) (plurality opinion) (listing these
cases).
8. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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himself,9 and so on. Those cases were part of a larger movement to
breathe new life into the Constitution, to make meaningful its protec-
tions of civil liberties and civil rights. It was in that atmosphere of
what I would call "constitutional hope" that the case of Gideon v. Wain-
wright came along.
I well remember how I first encountered the case; I was covering
the Supreme Court then. As part of the job I read the regular,
printed petitions for review that came along. But I could not read the
hundreds and hundreds of typewritten or handwritten documents
that reached the court from indigent petitioners, mostly prisoners.
This was in the pre-xerox age, ladies and gentlemen. Only one copy
of those handwritten or typewritten petitions existed, and it was circu-
lated among the Justices. So until they acted on it, we the press (the
few of us who were then covering the Court) could not see it. When
the Court infrequently granted one of those indigent petitions, then
the jacket containing the documents would go back to the file room
and I would read it. That's what I did on June 4, 1962, when the
Court agreed to hear the case of Clarence Earl Gideon.
In granting review, the Justices asked counsel to discuss this ques-
tion: Should this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady'be reconsidered?
That made it evident that the Court was ready to change its mind and
require that the states as well as the federal government provide coun-
sel for defendants too poor to retain their own. It needed no great
wisdom to understand that it was a case of singular importance. In
our system of federalism the overwhelming proportion of criminal
prosecutions are brought by state authorities. So, potentially, the de-
cision to overrule Betts would have a broad impact.
When I looked at Gideon's documents that day there was another
notable aspect to the case. He was a prisoner in the Florida State Pen-
itentiary in Raiford, a man who had been convicted several times in
his life for petty crimes and now was serving five years for stealing a
small amount of money from a pool room in Panama City, Florida.
He had written the Court a letter on a lined prison pad, and the
Supreme Court of the United States had responded to this powerless
person, this loser, because he had had the gumption to protest when
he was tried and convicted without a lawyer. It was a romantic story,
ideally suited for journalists, and that is what it went on being.
To argue the case, as you just heard, the Court appointed Abe
Fortas, one of the most skillful and powerful lawyers in Washington.
So from having no one to speak for him, Gideon now had the best.
9. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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Fortas, assisted by Abe Krash, wrote a superb brief and made a com-
pelling oral argument. The Court decided unanimously in Gideon's
favor, overruling Betts v. Brady. And then, poetically, the Court's opin-
ion was written by Justice Hugo Black, the sole remaining member of
the Court who had passed on Betts v. Brady. He had dissented in Betts
and had lived to see it overruled. Still the romance was not over. The
Court's decision meant that Gideon was entitled to a new trial, this
time with a lawyer provided by the state of Florida. I went down to
Panama City for that trial. Gideon's appointed lawyer, Fred Turner
(played in the movie, if you've seen it, by a very good character actor
named Lane Smith) did a fine job. The jury quickly brought in a
verdict of acquittal.
It was, as I say, a romantic story. That helped greatly when I wrote
the book about it. Imagine what a letdown it would have been if the
jury in the second trial had convicted Gideon. But ladies and gentle-
men, I have to tell you that the romance has faded. I said in my book
that it would be an enormous social task to bring to life the dream of
Gideon v. Wainwright-the dream of a vast, diverse country in which
every man charged with a crime will be capably defended no matter
what his economic circumstances, and in which the lawyer represent-
ing him will do so proudly, without resentment at an unfair burden,
sure of the support needed to make an adequate defense. That has
not happened.
A book just published shows how far short we have fallen. It is No
Equal Justice1 ° by Professor David Cole of the Georgetown University
Law Center. Thirty-six years after the Gideon case was decided Profes-
sor Cole says: "Gideon's trumpet sounds only a distant and increas-
ingly hollow echo." One reason for that conclusion is that state and
local governments provide such meager resources of defense of poor
men and women charged with crimes. The national average spent per
case in 1990 (the last year for which we have figures) was five dollars
and thirty seven cents.
In cities that have full time public defenders, many are simply
overwhelmed. Rick Tisier, a public defender in New Orleans, pro-
tested his situation in 1991. In seven months that year he had repre-
sented 418 defendants. He had at least one serious case set for trial
on every trial date in that period. Often he was unable to meet his
client for an initial interview until that accused person had been in jail
for a month or two, at which point the best he could do might be to
10. DAVID CoLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM (1999).
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bargain a plea of guilty for time already served. Those of you in this
room, perhaps most of you who are lawyers, just think of that. A case
for which you are responsible, a criminal case, set for trial on every trial
date over seven months. That is surely not the dream of Gideon. New
Orleans is not unique. A public defender in Fulton County, Georgia,
Atlanta handles on average 530 felony cases a year. Overwork is the
norm everywhere, and that means a skimped defense.
In most states and cities the poor accused are represented not by
public defenders but by private lawyers assigned to their case. Here
again the resources made available are often a mockery of what fair-
ness requires. Fees fixed by statute range, Professor Cole says, "from
twenty dollars to fifty dollars per hour," which I don't have to tell you
is a fraction of what lawyers ordinarily charge. About a third of the
states set a limit per case on what appointed counsel can receive, no
matter how many hours they work. In Virginia the maximum is $350
for most felonies. 1 Kentucky has a limit of $1000 for noncapital fel-
ony cases, and $2500 for capital cases.1 2 A study found that the me-
dian time spent by a lawyer on a capital case ranges from 300 to 600
hours. Take the lower figure. An assigned counsel who spent 300
hours on a capital case would be paid a little over $8.00 per hour.
The American public has an image of criminal law based on sen-
sational televised cases-O.J. Simpson, the nanny Louise Woodward,
and the like. From those, we know that the defense lawyers hire inves-
tigators and experts, make innumerable motions, question potential
jurors at great length, and are so thoroughly prepared that they can
cross-examine prosecution witnesses in the most meticulous detail.
But the harried assigned counsel has little ability to do those things. A
study in New York showed that in three-quarters of homicide cases
(those are serious cases, ladies and gentlemen) assigned counsel filed
no pretrial motions.
The second reason that the dream of Gideon remains unrealized
has to do with the quality of representation provided for poor defend-
ants. To put it bluntly, the lawyers who defend the indigents are often
11. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (Michie Supp. 1999) (compensating, after July 1,
1999, appointed counsel $845 for representing indigent defendants accused of a felony
punishable by 20 years or more confinement, $318 for all other felonies, and "an amount
deemed reasonable by the court" for capital cases).
12. The Kentucky statutory scheme provides that, if an indigent defendant is not repre-
sented through the Department of Public Advocacy, but instead by an appointed counsel,
then the latter shall receive "reasonable and necessary fees and expenses," subject to the
limitation that "[n ] o fee shall be paid in excess of the prevailing maximum fee per attorney
paid by the Department of Public Advocacy for the type of representation provided." See
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.070 (Banks-Baldwin 1999).
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below the most minimal standards of competence and commitment.
Stephen Bright, who will be here later today, and who is the Director
of the Southern Center for Human Rights, and a devoted defender in
death cases, has shown that in a number of capital cases assigned
counsel slept during portions of the trial. I am sure he will tell you
about that in more compelling detail, but here is a description from
the Houston Chronicle of a 1992 capital trial in that city.
[D]efense attorneyJohn Benn spent much of Thursday after-
noon's trial in apparent deep sleep. His mouth kept falling
open and his head lolled back on his shoulders .... Every
time he opened his eyes a different prosecution witness was
on the stand .... When state district Judge Doug Shavers
finally called a recess, Benn was asked if he truly had fallen
asleep during a capital murder trial. "It's boring," the 72-
year-old long time Houston lawyer explained.13
Defense lawyers have used cocaine and heroin throughout a trial;
they have been drunk; they have said openly that they knew nothing
about the law or the facts at issue. Now why has nothing been done to
save the victims of such representation, the defendants? Because
when those convicted claim on appeal that they were denied the effec-
tive assistance of counsel appellate courts almost always turns them
down. In one case the defense lawyer made no opening statement
and did not object when the prosecutor told the jury about the de-
fendant's prior convictions. It turned out that the lawyer was suffering
from Alzheimer's Disease. But on appeal the court held that his
lapses did not amount to ineffective assistance because they might
have been "tactical decisions." 4
That case and many others like it are not eccentric. They follow
the leading Supreme Court case on the effectiveness of counsel, Strick-
land v. Washington15 decided in 1984. The Court held that there must
be a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
13. John Makeig, Asleep on theJob?, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 14, 1992, available in 1992 WL
8083373.
14. It is unclear to which case Mr. Lewis is referring. In Pilchak v. Camper, 741 F. Supp.
782, 792 (W.D. Mo. 1990), affd 935 F.2d 145 (8th Cir. 1991), the district court stated that
the fact that counsel suffered from Alzheimer's disease was not by itself sufficient to consti-
tute ineffective assistance of counsel absent a showing of actual prejudice. This court
granted the petitioner's writ, however, because "the cumulative effect of her trial counsel's
performance was-below the level of skill'customary for competent counsel similarly situ-
ated." Id. at 800.
15. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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range of reasonable professional assistance. 16 In practice, the test of
competence that has been suggested as ajoke-the spoon test to see if
the lawyer is breathing-is pretty close to the standard of competence
enforced by the courts for indigent defense.
Judges are responsible in another way. In many places they
choose the lawyers to represent poor defendants and they appoint
some who utterly lack the experience, skill, or will to do the job. In
Texas some of the appointees have been so incompetent or uncaring
that they have missed deadlines (not just one or two, but a fair
number) for filing motions that would hold up the execution of their
clients. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has dismissed those
cases one after another.17 I am sure that Steve Bright will have more
to say on that subject.
A lack of competent counsel when life is at stake seems to me the
most ghastly failure of our system, and it does happen. Some might
say, "Perhaps those Texas judges say to themselves, 'It doesn't matter;
those sentenced to death are evidently guilty and are only trying to
put off the inevitable by appeals and habeas corpus actions."' But that
is not so. In Illinois, in this decade, ten out of twenty-one prisoners on
death row have been freed after investigations carried out by journal-
ism students at their professors' suggestion have shown the prisoners
to be innocent.
One more reason for disappointment thirty-six years after Gideon
has to be mentioned. That is the fact the principle of publicly pro-
vided counsel for the poor criminal defendant is not applied at the
beginning of the process, when a person is arrested and wants to be
released on bail until his or her appearance in court. The result is
that many arrested persons spend weeks in jail quite unnecessarily.
Professor Colbert has studied and analyzed the situation in Maryland
(I'm sure he'll talk about it). He shows that the consequences are not
only unpleasant for those who are kept in overcrowded cells, but bur-
densome to the system and expensive to the taxpayer.
Ladies and gentlemen, this subject is not a trivial one. Roughly
three-quarters of those charged with crime in this country have no
money to pay for a lawyer. Our criminal law has grown increasingly
16. See id. at 689, 690 (asserting that "Ul]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must
be highly deferential," and must be conducted "in light of the facts of the case as of the
time of counsel's conduct," without the distorting effect of hindsight).
17. Cf., e.g., Bacey v. State, 990 S.W.2d 319, 333-34 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (denying capi-
tal defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because, although her lawyer
failed to schedule a hearing on a motion for a new trial within the statutory period, the
defendant's allegedly new evidence would not have produced a different result in the
trial).
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severe and sweeping in recent years. American sentences are savage
by world standards. We have more people in prison per capita than
any country on earth. So the way we treat the indigent accused is
extremely significant.
David Cole in his new book argues that the inequality in the way
our criminal justice system treats those with means and without is de-
liberate. He puts it this way. "By denying the poor adequate lawyers
and then holding their lawyers' mistakes against them, we guarantee
that we will never have to pay full cost for the Constitutional rights we
purport to protect. And we achieve those savings without diluting the
protections available to those who can afford competent counsel. We
will never achieve perfect equality between the rich and the poor in
legal assistance, but the current system does little more than place a
veneer of legitimacy on a system that is patently inadequate and
unjust."
Perhaps it is naivete on my part, or a too simple belief in funda-
mental American decency, but I cannot bring myself to accept Profes-
sor Cole's judgement. I prefer to think that we allow these wrongs to
happen out of ignorance, or at worst, because we shield ourselves
from unpleasant truths. If so, the remedy is to throw light, unremit-
ting light, on the unjust reality of unequal treatment in our courts.
That is what this Symposium can do and what all of us should be do-
ing in our lives. Our concern, as I said at the start, is not only for
those without means to defend against criminal charges, it is for us.
As good a statement of this concern as I know was made in 1910 by
Winston Churchill, who at the time was Home Secretary in the British
Government. I will end with what he said. "The mood and temper of
the public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of
the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country. A calm, dis-
passionate recognition of the rights of the accused and even of the
convicted criminal against the state, a constant heart searching by all
charged with the duty of punishment, unfailing faith that there is a
treasure if you could only find it in the heart of every man-these are
the symbols which, in the treatment of crime and criminal, mark and
measure the stored up strength of a nation and our sign and proof of
the living virtue in it."
Thank you.
ABE KRAsH
Thank you Dean Gifford. It's a pleasure for me to be here, and
especially a privilege for me to be here together with my old and good
friend Tony Lewis, since the thirty-sixth anniversary of the Gideon deci-
[VOL. 58:13331342
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sion by the Supreme Court is going to be observed next week, March
18th. So he and I are here together to lift a toast, or perhaps share a
toast, to a momentous occasion.
In looking over the extraordinary program which has been put
together for the next two days, it occurred to me-odd as it may seem
to you-that the organizers of this program may have been inspired to
some degree by Charles Dickens' A Christmas Carol If you recall, Dick-
ens wrote about Christmas past, Christmas present, and Christmas fu-
ture. In the same way the organizers of this Symposium have
organized a program which is devoted to Gideon past, Gideon present,
and Gideon future. You are going to be hearing in the next two days
from a number of highly experienced and very knowledgeable people
who are on the front line about the way in which Gideon is being im-
plemented, or more accurately, not being implemented, about the
way in which the high hopes have not been fulfilled, and, I am sure,
about various remedial steps that could be made to implement it.
I have been asked to focus primarily on the history and back-
ground of the decision. I want to say something about the roles of
Abe Fortas and Hugo Black. But I do want to share with you a few
thoughts at the outset, and in conclusion, about the present status of
Gideon.
Pursuing, if I may for a moment, the analogy from A Christmas
Carol, the truth is that many states and municipalities are Scrooges
when it comes to financing defense programs for indigent defendants.
The vast majority of defendants in both the state and federal criminal
system are indigent. Yet various estimates are that only about two and
one half percent of all the money that is appropriated for the adminis-
tration of criminal justice in this country is devoted to defense pro-
grams. There is no doubt whatsoever that the various defense
programs are grossly underfinanced and that there is an extremely
serious crisis affecting the right to counsel as a result of that. Now you
may ask, why is that? I believe that one of the major reasons is that
there is no effective constituency for the right to counsel. After all, we
are lobbying legislators for appropriations. After all, who are the ben-
eficiaries of those funds? They are by definition the poor and people
drawn by and large from minority groups, so that there is no one ef-
fectively present to lobby legislators for money to assist in defense pro-
grams. If these programs are to be adequately financed, I suggest the
responsibility rests with the Bar associations and with individual law-
yers and with the law schools, who must take up the cudgel and do the
job in educating legislators as to the need to finance this important
right.
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Now I am confident that a number of suggestions are going to be
made during this Symposium for remedial steps, for things that could
be done to make the right to counsel more effective. There are a
number of people, let us face it, who believe that talk about rights of
criminal defendants, of accused persons, is so much bah and humbug.
I suggest, however, that the right to counsel is intimately tied up with
the right to a fair trial and a fair hearing, and that right-the right to a
fair trial-is a fundamental precept in a just and free society.
Now let me return at this point to the past. Judge Arnold used to
say that, as he grew older, he realized that the things he remembered
best never took place. I may say that I have a very vivid memory in-
deed of the events I am going to talk to you about. I was a young
partner in the law firm of Arnold & Porter, then Arnold, Fortas &
Porter. When Abe Fortas asked me in the summer of 1962 to assist
him in writing the brief in the Gideon case, he said to me-and I recall
the incident vividly- he said, "I want you to tell me everything there
is to know about the right to counsel since the invention of money."
Now I want to begin more modestly this morning. Let me simply
describe to you what the status of the right to counsel was in 1962, at
the time we began to work on the case, so that you will appreciate
what the issues were that were presented to those of us who were advo-
cating Gideon's rights in the Supreme Court.
The important point to bear in mind is that there was a funda-
mental distinction between the right to counsel in the federal crimi-
nal prosecutions, on the one hand, and the right to counsel for
indigent defendants in the state courts. In the federal courts, the
Supreme Court had ruled in 1938 that every accused person was enti-
tled by reason of the Sixth Amendment, if he was unable to hire a
lawyer, to have a lawyer appointed to assist him. 8 That was true in all
felony prosecutions in the federal courts. In the state courts the situa-
tion was that, in capital cases, that is, in cases where the charge in-
volved a death penalty, the state was required to appoint a counsel in
all such cases.' 9 But in 1942, in a case arising from Maryland entitled
Betts v. Brady,2" to which Tony Lewis referred, the Supreme Court de-
18. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) ("The Sixth Amendment withholds
from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an
accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel." (footnote
omitted)).
19. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (stating that "in a capital case, where the
defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own
defense ... it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him
as a necessary prerequisite of due process of law").
20. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
[VOL. 58:13331344
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cided that accused persons in state felony prosecutions which did not
involve the death penalty were entitled to the assistance of a lawyer
under the Constitution only if there were special circumstances in the
case, such that, if the accused were tried without a lawyer, one could
say in retrospect that the trial had been unfair." For example, if the
defendant were a mentally retarded person or a very young person,
the Supreme Court would say that in such circumstances the defend-
ant had been denied a fair trial. But there were a great many cases
where there were no special circumstances. So the persons were tried
without a lawyer, found guilty, and sent to prison frequently for long
terms.
Now, although the states were not required by the federal Consti-
tution to do so, the great majority of states had in fact by 1962 estab-
lished a right to counsel in all felony prosecutions, both in capital and
noncapital cases. They had done so either by state constitutional pro-
visions, by state statutes, by court decisions, or by court practice. In-
deed that was true of forty-five states. There were only five states as of
1962 that did not guarantee an accused defendant who was indigent a
lawyer in every case. Those five states were five southern states: Ala-
bama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
Now let me say it was not an accident-you should not think it
was an incredible event-that the Supreme Court should have
plucked Clarence Earl Gideon's handwritten petition out of hundreds
of petitions which came to the Court and decided to accept his case
for review. The fact is that the Court had been on the lookout, I think
for some time, for a case which presented the question of the right to
counsel, and Gideon's petition presented that case in as direct a way
as one could hope for. I think that the Court, or at least that a major-
ity of the Justices of the Court by 1962, had grown weary of the endless
process of reviewing case after case which came to the Supreme Court
involving the question whether the accused had been denied a fair
trial by reason of special circumstances. I think they were looking for
a case which would help them escape that particular predicament. I
think a number ofJustices were already convinced that you could not
have a fair trial without a lawyer assisting the defendant. The Gideon
case presented this issue directly. That is, it presented the question
whether there was a fair trial in a noncapital state felony prosecution
in the absence of a lawyer.
21. See id. at 473 (stating that counsel is required when "want of counsel in a particular
case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness [as would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment]").
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Now, apart from the basic issue of fairness, one of the great de-
fects of this "special circumstances" test was that it invited endless liti-
gation. There was simply no end to the number of cases which could
arise in which that issue was presented. There was another problem.
In every case in which a defendant was convicted without a lawyer, he
would file a petition subsequent to the case saying that he had been
denied a fair trial because he was not afforded a right to counsel. In
addition, because the defendant did not have a lawyer, issues which
could have been adjudicated or tried by a trial court in the presence
of a lawyer were never raised and not decided, and that burden fell on
appellate courts. It was a rule which made no sense; it was not an
administratively defensible rule.
Now the two principle architects of the Gideon decision, given this
background, were Abe Fortas and Justice Hugo Black. Fortas was ap-
pointed by the Supreme Court to write the brief on behalf of Gideon
and to present the oral argument. Hugo Black wrote the opinion of
the court. I want to say a few words, since we celebrate the thirty-sixth
anniversary of Gideon this morning, to recall each of them and the
contribution they made to the case and to say something about their
very special and unique role. They were each in their own way re-
markable men and the case bears the imprimatur of each one of
them.
Let me begin by telling you something about Abe Fortas. Abe
Fortas was a student of legendary brilliance at the Yale Law School in
the early 1930s and came to Washington as a lawyer in the New Deal,
and became, I think, famous among a renowned group of lawyers as
one of the great lawyers in the New Deal era. After the war he started
a law firm and private practice in Washington. He was not a specialist
in the criminal law. His practice was primarily in matters involving
various problems with the government in Washington. As I say, his
practice did not involve the criminal law, except tangentially, but he
had a very great interest in the criminal law.
In 1953 he was appointed counsel by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a case which raised the
question of the insanity defense. It was a case called Durham v. United
States,22 and I am sure that those of you who are students in law school
today will have read that case. I was then a very young lawyer in the
firm and he asked me to help him write the brief on that case. He
argued at that time that the existing standard of criminal responsibil-
22. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
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ity, which was the so called "right and wrong" test adopted in England
in the mid-nineteenth century, was obsolete. Indeed he persuaded
the Court of Appeals which, I think, was very much of that mind any-
way, to adopt a totally new standard of criminal responsibility. It revo-
lutionized the whole insanity defense in criminal cases. So Fortas was
known to be a person with a keen interest in problems of the adminis-
tration of criminal justice. He also, I should tell you, had a very pas-
sionate interest in questions of civil liberties. It was really in large part
under his leadership that our law firm became involved during the
McCarthy era in the early 1950s with representing government em-
ployees charged with questions of loyalty and security, cases in which
there were very grave and serious questions about freedom of speech
and freedom of association on the part of government employees. It
was a rather dreadful period in American history I might say, and a
period in which a relatively small group of lawyers had the courage to
stand up. Abe Fortas and his partners Paul Porter and Thurmond
Arnold did so. So Fortas had these two great interests.
Now the Supreme Court, of course, was well aware that the Gideon
case presented an issue of critical importance, and it was obvious that
Gideon had no lawyer and that a lawyer had to be appointed. They
wanted, I think it's clear that particularly ChiefJustice Warren wanted,
to have an outstanding lawyer appointed. Fortas was known to be a
brilliant advocate, and accordingly he was appointed. I should tell
you that I regard him as a tragic figure in many ways. But Fortas was
without any doubt one of the best lawyers of his generation.
Now Fortas wanted to persuade the entire Supreme Court, he
wanted all nine of the Justices to agree, that there was a right to coun-
sel in every felony prosecution in this country. That was the objective
he put before me and the other young men who were working with
him and assisting him in writing the brief in this case. What was the
major obstacle he faced? You have to appreciate the problems that
confronted him as an advocate. The problem in a nutshell was this.
There were a number of Justices on the Court who were reluctant to
expand the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was the criti-
cal Amendment here, to impose further restrictions on the states in
areas of criminal law. In other words there were questions, if you will,
of states' rights, of state sovereignty involved here. The problem For-
tas had, the problem he put to us, was how to address this particular
problem of states' rights or state sovereignty-because we wanted to
get those Justices who we knew would be reluctant to expand the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to join the opinion. There were
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basically two ramps, two roadways which Fortas devised as ways to deal
with this issue.
The first point he made was that it would not be a revolutionary
step to impose a requirement on the states that they must provide a
lawyer in all cases because forty-five states already did so, as did the
federal government. So we weren't talking about anything revolution-
ary. This was not a radical step to require a few remaining states who
didn't do it to do it.
The second thing, and this was one of Fortas's great insights and
contributions to the whole case, was that he perceived that the special
circumstances test was a test that should not be supported by those
Justices on the Court who were sympathetic to claims of states' rights
or state sovereignty. Why not? Because Fortas pointed out that in
every case tried in a state court where the defendant was tried without
a lawyer, that defendant then would appeal to a federal judge in the
habeas corpus proceeding to set aside the state court's judgement.
And Fortas asked rhetorically, and I think with great force, "What
could be more of an affront to the state court judges than to have
their judgements being reversed day after day by federal judges under
a standard so ambiguous, so vague, as 'special circumstances"'? It was
an extraordinarily clever and insightful point because it was a way of
persuading the Justices of the Court that the special circumstances test
was in fact a test that they should not continue to embrace, even those
Justices who were sympathetic to states' rights.
The basic argument that Fortas made in the brief-he was the
author of the brief, the "brains of this case," let me assure you-the
basic argument was essentially a very simple one and an elementary
one. His fundamental point, which was illustrated in the brief in
many different ways, was that an accused person cannot have a fair
trial in the absence of a lawyer. An accused person who is not a
trained lawyer is incapable of examining or making an argument
about whether an indictment is valid, whether a search and seizure
has been properly conducted, whether there is an improperly admit-
ted confession. A layman is not capable of conducting an examina-
tion or cross-examination in the court room. He is not competent to
participate in post-trial proceedings relating to sentence. He is totally
at sea in the courtroom. In short, a lawyer for the defense is
indispensable.
Now in the oral argument Fortas made another point. He argued
that if you look at the way in which a court is structured or composed,
a properly structured court consists of a judge, a prosecuting attorney,
ajury in criminal cases, and, if you don't have a defendant's lawyer at
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the table, an important person in the cast of characters is missing.
And that was a very dramatic and insightful point.
Now, as I say, the brief was really an elegant brief and I think it is
frequently examined by students as an example of great advocacy.
The oral argument, I would simply say, reminds you of what Justice
Douglas wrote in his memoirs of the Court years, which he published
in 1975. Douglas said that Fortas's oral argument in the Gideon case
was the best oral argument that Douglas heard in the thirty-six years
that Douglas sat on the Supreme Court. So that will give you some
indication of the level of advocacy which Clarence Earl Gideon had
received in this case.
Let me turn at this point to Justice Hugo Black. There was a biog-
raphy of Black recently published by Roger Newman. Newman de-
scribes the situation in the courtroom that morning. He said that
when Chief'Justice Warren called on Black on the bench to deliver the
Court's opinion, Black leaned forward, and he spoke in an almost
folksy way reading sections of the opinion. Happiness, contentment,
gratification, filled his voice. Newman goes on to say, "It was indeed a
moment of supreme satisfaction for Hugo Black, one of the highlights
of Black's thirty-four years on the Supreme Court." I'll explain why it
was really a wonderful moment for Hugo Black.
Black had dissented from the Court's opinion in 1942 when the
Court had said that a accused person was entitled to a lawyer only if
there were special circumstances. He had written a brief dissenting
opinion at that time. 23 In the years that followed, Black had fought
vigorously for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, the Due Process Clause specifically, made each one of
the Bill of Rights applicable also to the states. One of Black's most
famous opinions was an opinion he wrote in 1948 called Adamson v.
California,24 in which Black had reviewed the whole history of the
Fourteenth Amendment and argued that the true meaning of this
Amendment, adopted after the Civil War, was to make the Bill of
Rights effective as against the states. The Supreme Court had refused
to accept Black's view of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in case af-
ter case, a majority of the Court had begun to incorporate some of the
Bill of Rights as against the states. By 1963, at the time Gideon was
decided, the Supreme Court decided, for example, that the right of
23. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
24. 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947) (holding that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrim-
ination does not apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment), overruled by Mal-
loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (holding the contrary). For the opinion ofJustice Black
referred to by Mr. Krash, see Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-123 (Black, J., dissenting).
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free speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, was applicable
to the states by reason of the Due Process Clause.2 5 Or that for exam-
ple, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is cov-
ered by the Fourth Amendment, is incorporated in the Due Process
Clause and is good against the states.26 Or that the right against cruel
and unusual punishment, which is provided by the Eighth Amend-
ment, was also something that the states could not violate by reason of
the Fourteenth Amendment.27 But the right to counsel had not been
so incorporated. What made the Gideon case so wonderful for Black
was that the majority of the Court agreed with him in Gideon that the
Fourteenth Amendment did incorporate the right to counsel. So, it
was a triumphant moment for Black after all of the years and the ef-
fort that he had poured into establishing that particular doctrine.
Now let me say that there are two separate themes in Black's
opinion; by the way, these themes are as significant today as they were
then. The first theme in Black's opinion is that the right to counsel is
essential to a fair hearing and is therefore essential to due process of
law. The second theme in Black's opinion is that a right to counsel is
essential because of equal protection.
Now let me speak for a moment about each of those two things.
First, Black's opinion reflects the view that in our adversary system of
justice you can't have a fair trial in the absence of a lawyer at the
defendant's side. Black knew from personal experience how impor-
tant that right was. You must remember that Black had been a county
prosecutor in Alabama. He had been a state trial court judge. He
knew from his own experience as a lawyer how important a trial lawyer
was. He had been a county prosecutor in Birmingham, Alabama
which was a tough steel town in the early years of this century. And as
he stated in his opinion in Gideon, "[R] eason and reflection require us
25. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (holding that the establish-
ment clause of the First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that the
right of free speech is a fundamental one that applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
26. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (applying the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding "that the
exclusionary rule is an essential part of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments").
27. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (holding that a law that pun-
ishes individuals for being addicted to narcotics violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment, which applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any per-
son haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be as-
sured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."28 The first
theme was a reflection of Black's experience. I recall once being pres-
ent when Black, in a small audience, was talking to students one eve-
ning, and somebody asked him about the right to trial by jury. I will
never forget the passion, and the eloquence, and the force when
Black began to speak of the right to trial by jury. Black was a fighter
and you have to understand how passionate and how intensely he felt
about these fundamental human rights. The Gideon case reflects, in
that sense, his intensity, his conviction that this was essential to the
right of people in a free society.
As I say, there were two themes in the opinion. The first was the
right to a fair trial. The other theme was the right to counsel for indi-
viduals regardless of their economic circumstances. Hugo Black had a
profound empathy for persons who were disadvantaged. That too re-
flected the fact that he had witnessed the poverty and the racism grow-
ing up as a poor young man in Clay County, Alabama, and in being a
lawyer in Birmingham, Alabama. When he ran for the Senate in 1926,
I think it's interesting what Black's motto was. He said, "I am not now
and I've never been a railroad power company or corporation lawyer.
I am not a millionaire." And it was simply unacceptable to Black that
a man should be denied a fair trial because he didn't have the money
to hire a lawyer. For Hugo Black, a lawyer in a criminal case was not a
luxury; it was a necessity. If you read his opinion, it reflects these two
great and profound themes which I think are still cornerstones of the
right to counsel.
Let me say a final word about Black. Of all the men and women
in public life in Washington-I have been a lawyer there now for
nearly half a century-I regard Hugo Black as one of the most admira-
ble men in public life whom I experienced and witnessed in Washing-
ton. The Gideon decision, I believe, really is one of his greatest
legacies to the country, of many great legacies that he bequeathed to
US.
Finally, there is no doubt that the Gideon decision did have signifi-
cant effects. To begin with, it did establish a regime in which at least
there was some lawyer for the accused in every felony prosecution in
this country. We could say that an indigent defendant was entitled to
a lawyer in every criminal case. There were some public defender of-
fices in place at the time the Gideon case was decided, but the Gideon
28. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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case inspired the expansion and development of the public defender
movement. Most significantly, I think the Gideon case did enhance
consciousness of Americans to the importance of a fair trial for all
accused persons. It was a consciousness heightening decision.
In retrospect there are several things at the time Gideon was de-
cided that we simply did not fully appreciate or emphasize. First, all
of our emphasis at that time was on the right of a defendant to any
lawyer. What we did not fully appreciate was that it is not enough just
to say that you're entitled to some lawyer or a lawyer. One needs to
have a lawyer who is competent to try a criminal case. To appoint
individuals who are neophytes, who have never been in a court room,
or hacks, or people who are marginally competent, does not satisfy in
a meaningful sense the right to counsel. At that time we were not
sufficiently focusing on that point. Second, I think we did not suffi-
ciently stress the point that, in order to have an effective defense, the
defense lawyer has to have funds to conduct an investigation, to retain
experts, and do the other things that one needs to do if one is effec-
tively preparing a case for trial. The right to counsel is meaningless if
a lawyer does not have the resources to do those kind of things. Fi-
nally, our focus in Gideon, because of the kind of case it was-an ap-
peal from the denial of counsel at trial-was on the trial stage. But
the truth is that you need to have counsel at every stage of the pro-
ceedings. Here in Maryland, for example, there is a struggle to estab-
lish the right to counsel at the time of the question of bail. That is a
vital right, because if an accused person does not have that right he
may languish in jail for weeks and months and his case may be se-
verely prejudiced as a result of the denial of counsel at the bail stage.
By denying counsel at the bail stage you are effectively denying due
process of law. You are effectively denying, in my judgement, the
right to counsel that is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
The problem of providing lawyers for indigent defendants has
been exacerbated by a number of things which occurred subsequent
to the Gideon decision in 1963. First of all, there has been the tremen-
dous flood of narcotics prosecutions, which was not true in 1963, but
which has greatly increased the volume of cases. In the second place,
there has been this drive for indeterminate sentences, which makes
the need for a lawyer that much more intense. A third thing has been
that there has been since 1963 the movement to transfer juvenile de-
fendants out of the juvenile courts into the adult courts. Fortas him-
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self was later to write an opinion in a case called Gault29 that there
should be a lawyer for accused persons in juvenile cases. But moving
juveniles into adult courts just underscores the need for the right to
counsel.
Thus, a number of things have happened to make the need for
counsel greater than it was in 1963. I think it is true, and I think it
must be said with some sadness, that the high hopes that we had for
Gideon in 1963 have not been fulfilled. Nevertheless, having said that,
I think one must recognize the fact that there have been very signifi-
cant steps, and that progress has been made.
I find it significant that the Gideon decision has been immune
from attack. It is immune from attack-it is not criticized-even by
those persons who are most critical of a number of decisions by the
Court led by ChiefJustice Warren. For example, the view of the Court
under Warren with respect to the -right of habeas corpus has been
considerably narrowed since 1963. The exclusionary rule with respect
to illegal searches and seizures has been under attack. Recently, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit raised questions which I think
go to the validity or vitality of the Miranda test, that is, the right to be
informed that you have a right to a lawyer. 31
So a number of the decisions by the Warren court that were de-
cided in the 1960s, which many of us thought were steps forward and
which we welcomed, have been attacked and criticized since those
years. But the Gideon decision is not criticized or attacked. I do not
know of any responsible voice-Tony Lewis perhaps could attest to
this-which has been raised anywhere against the Gideon case. I know
of no one who stands up and who says, "We should in this country try
people without their having a defense lawyer at their side." No one
argues that. No responsible voice would be heard saying that. Every-
one accepts the right. The sad thing is that we have accepted the
right, given lip service to it, but we have not made it truly meaningful.
That is the challenge which confronts us in the future.
So the Gideon decision, as we observe here the thirty-sixth anniver-
sary of this great case, is indeed a milestone in American Constitu-
tional Law, and is indeed a great decision, because it affirms a
29. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1966) (holding that indigent juveniles have a right to
appointed counsel in delinquency hearings that could result in commitment to an
institution).
30. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir.) (holding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501, which overruled Miranda and has not been enforced by the Department ofJustice,
governs the admissibility of confessions in federal courts), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578
(1999).
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principle that is, in my view, essential to a just and free society: the
right to a lawyer in order to have a fair trial. Thank you very much.
AFTERNOON SESSION
PROFESSOR DOUG COLBERT
On the program we had invited the Chief Judge of the Maryland
Court of Appeals, Robert Bell, to appear and unfortunately Judge Bell
notified us this week that he could not attend because of a scheduling
conflict; he is chairing a Bar Association committee in New Orleans.
But we do have a wonderful colleague of Judge Bell who is here to
speak to us today. I am speaking ofJudge Arrie Davis, who is currently
ajudge on Maryland's intermediate appellate court, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals.
Judge Davis graduated from University of Baltimore Law School
and also received his Master's Degrees in English and taught English
in the public school system before he launched his legal career. Prior
to being ajudge, he worked for ten years as an Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, mostly in the criminal appeals bureau, but also representing the
Department of Public Safety. So let us all welcome Judge Arrie Davis.
JUDGE ARRIE W. DAVIS
I need to start off by saying who I am not. You have already been
told that I am not Chief Judge Bell. I also am not Judge Andre Da-
vis.31 Judge Andre Davis and I were colleagues for approximately two
months just before I went on the Court of Special Appeals in 1990,
and I got everything, including his bills. The only thing that I did not
get delivered to me was his paycheck. In fact, I once got this phone
call, where someone said, "They are down there picketing you; they
want to throw you off the bench." I looked out the window and there
were approximately eighteen to twenty people with signs saying, "Kick
Judge Arrie Davis off the bench, he is not fair." So I made a phone
call and asked the person, "What is this all about?" They told me,
"Apparently, you tried some domestic case and the wife is not happy
with how you tried the case, and those people want your hide, so when
the election comes up they want you thrown off the bench." I said,
"Wait a minute, I have not tried a domestic case for six years; I don't
know what this is all about." Finally, it turns out that it was Andre
Davis they were after. I called him up and said, "Look Andre, these
31. The Honorable Andre M. Davis presently sits on the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland.
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people are down here picketing me and it is really you they want, and
you go down there right this minute and straighten this out." He said,
"Ah, you have got to be kidding."
Let me say, first of all say, with respect to Judge Bell, I was in
Annapolis both on Monday and Tuesday, and I got a phone call late
Monday night. Judge Bell called and said, "Hey, look, I have a conflict
and I really would appreciate it if you would show." I asked him what
it was all about, and he told me that it had to do with the Gideon Sym-
posium. I initially thought that Professor Colbert was looking for
somebody to speak about Gideon and its progeny and so forth. So,
since I was not going to be in my office on Tuesday-I was due to sit in
Annapolis-I called my law clerk, who put something together so that
I could have a presentation for today. He began putting together the
handout that you have. I am not going to get into that handout, with
the exception of making one or two references to it. I simply want to
explain to you that I came not being exactly sure what it was I am
supposed to be addressing, but I am told that you have been so inun-
dated with Gideon and all of the cases that have followed Gideon that I
need to deal with some things that are more from a personal vantage
point or, so as to speak, the view from the bench.
I am going to try to wrap all of this up in ten to twelve minutes
and allow at least three to four minutes for questions, if you so choose.
Let me outline briefly what I want to do before I begin. I am not
getting into the right to counsel per se at all. What I really want to
talk about has to do with the effective assistance of counsel, and I am
going to focus on contrasting the Public Defender with private coun-
sel, and my own experience with respect to that.
I was admitted to the Bar in November of 1969. Judge Bell and I
were admitted at the same time. I bring that up because in 1969,
which is only five years after Gideon, there was no Public Defender
Office in Maryland. I am told that there are still some states that have
not adopted the Public Defender System. That meant that indigent
defendants had to rely on a system that was not quite as structured as
the Public Defender system is. One thing that Chief Judge Bell could
do here this afternoon that I probably cannot is to crunch the num-
bers and give you some idea about the case-load and the fact that it is
overloaded. You ask: Why is that important for the right to counsel?
The issue of time is important because, when you are talking
about the Public Defender System the key point is that, even if you
have someone who is competent, who wants to do a good job, the
absolutely essential factor in representing someone effectively is the
time that it takes to do it. If you have a case-load which makes you cut
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that time short, then there is no possible way that you can do the kind
of job you need to do.
To make sure we are all on the same page, when I speak about
"time," I mean that when you first bring on board a client, it is abso-
lutely critical to take whatever time is needed. It may not be but ten to
fifteen minutes if it is a petty case that does not involve jail time. But
especially if the case is more complicated, the initial interview is cru-
cial. You have to know what issues you are dealing with, insofar as you
can get it out of your client, because if you don't take that time ini-
tially then, like building a faulty foundation, what you do from that
point on may get thrown off. You may allow somebody who should
not be convicted to be convicted because that amount of time was not
spent. So let me try to make clear exactly what I am saying. We are
not dealing with an incompetent lawyer. We are talking about a com-
petent lawyer here, but a competent lawyer who has to restrict his or
her time so much that he or she simply cannot make the diagnosis. I
guess a doctor is a good example. If a doctor does not spend the time
to figure out what your illness is, and he tries to operate, he may take
out your appendix when really you may have a heart condition-I
think you get the point that I am trying to make.
Let me talk very briefly about what I do right now. When I first
came on the Court of Special Appeals, we had a system where we dis-
tributed all of the collateral proceedings among all thirteen judges.
That system went by the boards, in 1991 or so, when Judge Wilner"2
became the new Chief Judge, after Chief Judge Gilbert died. (I am
Judge Gilbert's replacement.) At that time Judge Wilner put together
a panel, consisting of Judge Wilner, Judge Garrity, and Judge Bloom,
because Judge Garrity and Judge Bloom were both located in the An-
napolis courthouse. Now, since Judge Wilner is on the Court of Ap-
peals, ChiefJudge Murphy, Judge Harrell, 3 and I handle all collateral
proceedings. The largest bulk of those collateral proceedings are
post-convictions.
We usually receive forty to fifty applications for leave to appeal
per month. We meet, after the staff attorney has read the transcripts
of the post-conviction proceedings and reviewed the applications, and
then we review them. The bulk of the post-conviction proceedings
that we decide are on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Now, I am not prepared to say, based on what we decide on those
32. The Honorable Alan M. Wilner presently sits on the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
33. Since this Symposium, Judge Glenn T. Harrell has been appointed to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland.
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applications for leave to appeal to our court, whether there is merit to
any particular percentage of those applications because all we can do
is to look at what has transpired at the proceeding. I guess the best
example that I can give you is that if an attorney testifies that a deci-
sion was a trial tactic, then we usually have to accept that on face
value.
In any event, we very rarely grant the petition on the basis of inef-
fective assistance of counsel. That does not mean that there has not
been an ineffective assistance of counsel. But I do get to see those
petitions as they come through.
Let me move along quickly to some other things I want to cover.
When I first went into the State's Attorney's Office in 1969, right after
I passed the Bar, my first case-I sat second chair with Howard Car-
din, who is Delegate Cardin's brother-involved the murder case of a
thirteen-year-old girl in a tropical fish store. There, Doug Sharetts was
the assigned, or appointed, Public Defender.
Let me explain. In 1970 there was an Arraignment Court and a
lot of lawyers would just hang around the Arraignment Court like
dogs waiting for a bone. Ultimately, the judge would look at a given
case on arraignment and say, "Mr. Morris Kaplan, take this gentleman
outside in the hallway, talk to the client, and see whether you can
represent him." Mr. Kaplan might talk to the client for ten to fifteen
minutes, and return and say, "Yes, Judge, I can represent him." That
is the way indigent defendants got lawyers back in those days. It is
hard for us even now to conceive that you would get a lawyer that way.
Now, in the Public Defender's Office you have to fill out forms, you
have to attest to indigency, and, I believe, the forms include a provi-
sion where you have to indicate that you will reimburse them under
certain conditions.
All of that formality was not present at that time. You simply were
told by ajudge, "Hey, you have a case here." You would take the client
and try to talk to him. Again, I am getting back to the theme I started
out with. There might have been some competent lawyers (I think
about Doug Sharetts, who was an absolutely excellent trial lawyer), but
under that system the problem you had was this, no matter how bright
the lawyer was: (1) Did that lawyer have the time to do the proper
interview and diagnosis of what his client's case was about? (2) Did the
lawyer do all the other things to prepare a good case?
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I prosecuted two death penalty cases when I was in the State's
Attorney's office, and death was imposed. But Furman v. Georgia"M
came along, and both sentences were commuted. Now, of course, a
prosecutor must serve notice of intent to seek the death penalty. But
at that time-and I thought it was shocking- the prosecutor did not
have to do anything. All one had to do was put on one's case. If the
judge thought that this was the sort of case where the defendant
needed to be put to death, then the judge simply would listen to the
arguments of both sides, and the judge would indicate beforehand
that he was going to impose death. But there was no pre-notification
that your client (if you were a defense attorney) potentially was going
to be subjected to the death penalty. When I think about how cavalier
things were back in those days, I shutter because at every juncture you
need to put yourself in the position of that defendant and say, "That
could be me." Believe it or not, innocent men do get convicted. Be-
lieve it or not, innocent men do go to jail.
Let me continue and very briefly touch upon a key point that I
want to make. I was a trial judge for ten years, and during that period
of time, I tried Nathaniel Applebee, which was a death penalty case.35
Kurt Schmoke, who is now Mayor,36 was the prosecutor, and Anton
Keeting was the defense attorney. Applebee was charged with killing
Herman Tolson, who was a prison guard, and he stabbed and injured
Willie Newkirk. Anton Keeting was appointed as a panel attorney
from the Public Defender's Office. That is a case where I do not think
that any more could have been done for Nathaniel Applebee. I think
Mr. Keeting did as magnificent a job as one could do, simply because
the circumstances were such that he was not going to have the defend-
ant found not guilty. This murder took place in a prison setting with a
million witnesses, so the defendant was going to be found guilty. But
what Mr. Keeting did prove was that, normally, when there is going to
be a fight in prison, people put newspapers and towels inside their
clothing so that if someone stabs them with a shank it would blunt the
blow and keep them from being injured. Mr. Keeting proved that
Nathaniel Applebee was stripped down to his waist. The jury then
decided-the logic may be flawed, but at least they were thinking-
that the fact that he was stripped to his waist meant that there was no
34. 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that, in light of the statutory sen-
tencing schemes used in the capital cases before the Court, the imposition of the death
penalty in those cases violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment).
35. This case appears to be unreported.
36. Since this Symposium, Martin O'Malley has ben elected Mayor of Baltimore.
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premeditation. In effect, Mr. Keeting saved Applebee from getting
the death sentence.
The point I want to make has to do more with effective assistance
of counsel from the perspective of a judge. There is no worse
nightmare for any judge than to have a prosecutor who is doing an
absolutely extraordinary job, and then to have John Doe, the defense
attorney, looking around like he is trying to figure out where he is.
The judge has to try that case. The judge almost is forced into the
position of being an advocate, in order to keep the defendant from
being steam-rolled, because you know that if he does not get a fair
trial, or if the case truly involves ineffective assistance of counsel, then
the case is going to come back on post-conviction anyway.
That takes me back to the Schmoke, Keeting, and Nathaniel Ap-
plebee case. The two lawyers were absolutely superb. The number of
objections that were raised were very few because Mr. Keeting knew
the right questions to ask, so that there was no reason to object. It is
an absolute pleasure for a judge to try a case with two equal counsels,
two combatants on a level playing field. The idea in the adversary
system is that if both counsels are very strong, and both are pulling in
opposite directions, then what comes out in the middle is the truth.
That, theoretically, is what is supposed to happen. But, if you have
one strong adversary and one weak adversary, you will never get to the
truth because the weak adversary has never shown those facts that
would raise reasonable doubt, or do whatever it takes to protect the
interest of his client.
Going back to my own experience again-it has been almost nine
years since I have been a trial judge-I do not know how many of you
know who Jerome Deise is. Jerome became in charge of the Death
Penalty Unit. I can tell you without any question, he was a consum-
mate professional. I do not think that there are many private lawyers
who could have done a better job, in my experience, in the cases
before me. The other people who appeared before me most often are
in management now, like Elizabeth Julian, Michael Gambrill, Bridgett
Shepherd. These were the people who were in the Felony Trial Unit.
All of these people, I believe, were very competent. If they ever had a
problem, the problem was simply the one that I alluded to before-
that of time. If you have to allocate your time based on your case
load, then you are going to cheat your client if you do not give every
bit of time that is necessary to do an effective job, whatever that partic-
ular case involves. Some cases involve fifty hours for preparation,
some cases involve eighty hours, some involve more than that, but it is
crucial that you do what it takes to prepare. Preparation is everything.
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While I am talking about the Public Defender's office, I just want
to mention one thing in the handout I have given you. I have here
one page of the annual report of the Public Defender for fiscal year of
1998. I am going to read just one sentence to you. A letter was sent
by Mike Gambrel, who was the District Director, to a committee for
the Circuit Court, making recommendations as to what can be done
with the heavy case load that he had. He says in the letter, "We tried
three person teams in felony drug courts in 1997. The result was at-
torneys with case loads of 80 to 110 felony cases. With that number of
open files, the attorneys' ability to provide adequate representation is
seriously challenged." That is about as close as you can get to saying
that we are providing ineffective assistance of counsel. He is almost
coming out and saying it. This is a public document that has been
distributed where there is almost an admission that the Public De-
fender is not doing all that needs to be done because of the case load.
I am not saying in any way that any of those Public Defenders are
incompetent, or that they are not skilled attorneys. In fact, it has been
my experience that in many cases the Public Defenders do a betterjob
than some of the civil lawyers who do not practice criminal law who,
suddenly, because somebody is a friend of their mother, or father, or
relative, they take on that criminal case without having the foggiest
notion of criminal procedure. Still, they attempt to try a criminal case
even though they are civil lawyers. I guess Mr. Ginsberg3 7 is a good
example of what happens when a civil lawyer tries to become a crimi-
nal lawyer.
I am going to wind this up, but let me make one or two points
with respect to what I have said. The Arraignment Court, when I first
began practicing, was a court where there was not a lot of activity. In
order to understand the Arraignment Court, one has to understand
the context. When I began practicing, cocaine-and I will be very
blunt about this-powder cocaine was a drug that rich white people
used, and heroin and sometimes marijuana is what you were dealing
with here in Baltimore City. The drug trade was nowhere near what
we are talking about right now. I make that point because what is
driving so many things now, including the voluntary relinquishment
of a lot of constitutional rights and other protections, is this hysteria
in society that we have to do whatever it takes to deal with this drug
problem. If it means we let the police come in, like the Gestapo, and
go through our houses without warrants, or stop our cars with no ar-
ticulable suspicion, then we are doing whatever it takes to stop drugs.
37. Judge Davis presumably is referring to Monica Lewinsky's initial attorney.
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In order to do this, there are those of us who are willing to give up
those protections because the drug scourge is so bad.
It was not like this when I first began practicing. Now, over this
past year, I had occasion to sit in three or four arraignment courts,
when I was waiting to speak to judges who were presiding over those
arraignment courts. They have forty or fifty defendants shackled to-
gether across the front of the courtroom. The Public Defender comes
in with a little note pad and there are perhaps two or three prosecu-
tors scurrying around. It is almost like an auction. The Public De-
fender is moving from one client to the next to the next. The only
three things you deal with at arraignment are: (1) what the plea is
going to be; (2) whether a defendant wants to waive the jury trial and
to accept a court trial; and (3) whether the defendant has counsel.
What happens in these arraignment courts is that the Public Defend-
ers are going from person to person to figure out who wants to plead
guilty. A lot of these defendants simply want to get back out on the
street. Some of them may have very valid defenses, some of them may
be able to suppress the evidence because it was an illegal search, but
none of that matters in this circumstance, because all these shackled
people want to get out of there. So, out of those forty or fifty defend-
ant, perhaps ten or fifteen might make the decision to plead guilty.
Whether they have any merit to their case is beside the point. It is all
about administratively trying to move these cases along.
Another thing happens when you have this kind of climate. As I
said before, the situation is exactly analogous to that of a doctor.
When a doctor initially talks to that patient, the doctor must take the
time to find out what that patient's condition is. If the lawyer does not
find out, and take the time to find out, exactly what the lawyer is con-
fronted with, then everything from that point on may very well be
thrown off track, and may never get put back on track because time is
of the essence. Evidence gets destroyed, people change their stories,
people are intimidated-all kinds of things happen in criminal cases.
So it is important from the beginning that the lawyer do whatever is
needed to secure the defendant's rights.
The bottom line is that effective legal representation requires the
investment of time for consultation, investigation, interviewing of lay
and expert witnesses, review of reports, documentary and other evi-
dence, evaluation of the case, negotiation (possibly) with the prosecu-
tor, and preparation of trial strategy. All of these things are part of
representation. The resources that are available to the Public De-
fender budget or even to pay for private counsel dictate the amount of
time you can buy. It may sound very crude and crass to put it that way,
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but a defendant is buying time and buying services, whether they be
those of DNA expert Dr. Lee in the O.J. Simpson case, or hiring an
investigator to go out and find certain evidence. The issues are time,
services, and resources.
The Public Defender has to allocate its resources. The death
penalty cases that the Public Defender has are so important that the
Public Defender must allocate a large portion of its budget for those
cases. The question then becomes, with the huge mass of drug cases
and defendants-many of whom are just drug users who are trying to
sell to support their habits-how to allocate time and resources.
Under this circumstance, the allocation necessarily becomes skewed
to some extent. The allocation is less than what it needs to be for
many of the defendants because there simply is not enough time and
there are not enough resources for all of them. There are enough
judges, and there are enough prosecutors. Now, I was talking with
Professor Colbert, who thought that certain people with credibility
could successfully advocate for more money for the Public Defender
before the legislature. I do not quite agree with that. I think the legis-
lature is biased against the Criminal Defense Bar, no matter who goes
down there. While judges may get some money, and while prosecu-
tors may be able to get some money, I think the Public Defender's
Office is the step-child who is going to be looking at the doughnuts in
the bakery through the window.
I hope that I have added some practical considerations to all of
the legal considerations that you have been discussing. It is clearly a
new day now. I will leave you with just this one thought, which goes
back to the issue of drugs: I am a little troubled by the fact that you
have a new, more sophisticated defendant who does have a lot of
money from the drug trade, and white collar crimes are becoming
targeted in a much more high profile way by prosecutors now. What
happens-please try to follow me, because I do not want you to misun-
derstand what I am trying to say-is that the uglier the enemy gets,
the uglier you find yourself having to become. You find yourself de-
termined to get the enemy no matter what. I hope that all of us do
not lose our civil liberties because these powerful criminal defendants
make prosecutors feels that they must, at all costs, put these defend-
ants away.
PROFESSOR DOUG COLBERT
It has been a wonderful day thus far. I know that all of you who
are here are going to tell everyone who couldn't make it just what they
missed, and you are going to tell all of them, of course, to come to-
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morrow morning for the second half of this Symposium. This is really
a historic event. I could not think of anyone who would be a better
person to close the first day's event than Stephen Bright. In the words
of my dear friend Dan Givelber, "Steve represents everything that is
good about being a criminal defense lawyer." He truly is a remarkable
person. He is the head of the Southern Center for Human Rights.
He is a scholar, a teacher who has taught at Harvard Law School, Yale
Law School, Emory Law School, and Georgetown Law School. He is
someone who teaches all of us, every day that we hear him or watch
him, about what we need to do to be the strong and zealous advocates
for poor people and working poor people in this country.
It really is a great pleasure for me to introduce him. He has had a
brilliant record in capital cases; he is a consummate attorney. I can
only tell you, without in any way putting any pressure on Steve at all,
that you should hold on to your hats because you are in for a real
treat. Thank you.
PROFESSOR STEPHEN BRIGHT
I am honored to be here. It is a very important subject that obvi-
ously has been near and dear to my heart for a long time, ever since I
read a book by Anthony Lewis called Gideon's Trumpet.38 Here, Mr.
Lewis has talked about the challenge of bringing to life the dream of
Gideon. One thing always has disappointed me so often when I have
gone to meetings like this-I remember going to one at the American
Bar Association a few year ago in Atlanta. I saw all these people
crowding out of a room. I thought, "That must be the meeting." It
was a meeting about Gideon, and Tony Lewis and Abe Krash, and a
number of other people were on the panel. But it turned out that
that was not the room. When I got to the actual Gideon panel, there
were as few people in the audience as there were on the stage. The
room where all the people were crowding out into the hall was titled,
"How to Collect Your Fee In A Case." That says a lot about our
profession.
One of the things that Tony Lewis said in Gideon's Trumpet is that
it will be an enormous challenge to bring to life the promise of Gideon
v. Wainwright-the promise of a vast and diverse country where every
poor person would be capably defended by a zealous lawyer without
resentment and an unfair burden. In order to wrap up our day here, I
would like to talk a moment about why we have fallen so short of
meeting that challenge. It says a lot about our commitment to equal
38. LEwIs, supra note 2.
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justice under law. I think that we would all agree that we never have
had equal justice under law. But, it has always been an aspiration of
our legal system. That is why we have this motto on the front of the
Supreme Court building.
The place where our commitment to equal justice is probably
most tested is in the criminal justice system. It is there where we con-
front the emotions that come out of horrible crimes that have been
committed, and terrible inhumanities-things that often raise such
passions and such anger and that it is hard to look dispassionately at
whatever facts are present. The criminal justice system also is the
place where so often the Mack truck of poverty and the Allied Van of
race come into intersection, often with results that are not very good
for our justice system. And it is in the criminal justice system that we
have our commitment to equal justice, to enforcement of the Bill of
Rights, and to the right to counsel tested the most.
Now we are engaged, we are told by our political leaders, in a war
on crime, a war in which, we are told, that anything goes, as was said
this morning by Judge Arrie Davis. The notion is that we can do any-
thing because we are fighting a war against drugs or a war against
crime. Our politicians campaign on who can be most in favor of the
death penalty, who can be most for locking up more people for longer
periods of time-even in a country that locks up the largest percent-
age of its population of any country in the world. How can we charge
more children as adults-when we have children as young as thirteen
serving life in prison without any possibility of parole? I have come to
the conclusion that fairness has become a casualty of this war on
crime, as has our commitment to equal justice.
During one of the previous panels, someone mentioned that the
Center for State Courts has done a study about whether a defendant is
better off with a Public Defender or better off with private lawyers. I
did my own little study; admittedly it is anecdotal. I looked at a
wealthy habitual offender, the Royal Caribbean Cruise Line. As you
may or may not know, the Royal Caribbean Cruise Line was found
guilty last June for discharging oily waste in the Atlantic Ocean near
Puerto Rico. They paid a fine because you cannot put a cruise line in
jail, and they promised never to do it again. They were caught the
very next month doing exactly the same thing. They were repre-
sented by two former Attorneys Generals of the United States, Elliot
Richardson and Benjamin Civiletti, from here in Baltimore. They
were also represented by two former heads of the Environmental Pro-
tection Section of the United States Department of Justice. Since I
heard that, I have not lost a lot of sleep worrying about the quality of
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]GIDEoN-A GENERATION LATER
legal assistance that Royal Caribbean Cruise Line receives. Now, those
people down at the Center for State Courts may say that this defend-
ant would be better off with a Public Defender. But that is the sort of
conclusion one draws when one stays in the ivory tower, writes reports,
and does not go into the field and see what is happening.
Let me tell you something that we should be concerned about, a
much more important case, although I do not deny that discharging
waste into our oceans is extremely important. But even in today's
world life is surely more precious than any other thing. I want to tell
you about a death penalty case in Houston, Texas. If you want to un-
derstand the right to counsel, particularly in the context of capital
cases, then you have to understand Houston, because Harris County
(which includes Houston) is responsible for more executions than
any other state in the union except Texas itself. That is, if Harris
County were a state, it would have the second largest number of ex-
ecutions. It is undeniably the capital of capital punishment.
In the Houston Chronicle ran the following account of George Mc-
Farland's trial. I am quoting:
Seated beside his client . . .defense attorney John Benn
spent much of Thursday afternoon's [capital] trial in appar-
ent deep sleep. His mouth kept falling open and his head
lolled back on his shoulder, and then he awakened just long
enough to catch himself and sit upright. Then it happened
again. And again. And again. Every time he opened his
eyes, a different prosecution witness was on the stand
describing another aspect of [the case against his client]
George McFarland[, accused of] the robbery-killing of gro-
cer Kenneth Kwan. When state District Judge Doug Shaver
finally called a recess, Benn was asked if he truly had fallen
asleep during a capital murder trial. "It's boring," the 72-
year-old longtime Houston lawyer explained. 9
Now, you would think that that would offend the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, wouldn't you? In fact, that fairly feisty reporter
with the Houston Chronicle went up to the judge and confronted the
judge about it. He asked the judge, "How can you preside over a case
where the lawyer is sleeping during the trial." Judge Doug Shaver was
once described to me by a Texas lawyer as ajudge who would not read
a case even if you made him a photocopy and highlighted the holding
in it-I do not know if that is true, but that is what I was told. Now,
Judge Shaver said to the reporter, "Well, the Constitution guarantees
39. Makeig, supra note 13.
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you the right to a lawyer, but it does not guarantee that the lawyer has
to be awake." I guess that is what we call a strict construction.
It would be funny except for the fact that George McFarland's
case was upheld on direct appeal by the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals in McFarland v. State,4" in which the majority of the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals said that it is not a denial of the Six Amendment
right to counsel to have your lawyer sleep during the trial.4 1 The
court even suggested in its opinion-although there was not a shred
of evidence to support this-that perhaps the lawyer was sleeping as a
tactical decision to win sympathy.42 Of the two lawyers who repre-
sented George McFarland at his trial, one lawyer said that he spent
three hours preparing for that death-penalty trial, and the other law-
yer spent seven. Together, Mr. Benn, and the young lawyer appointed
to assist him, spent a grand total of ten hours preparing for a capital
trial.4" Rather than winning sympathy for their client by sleeping dur-
ing the trial, they might have tried something else, such as impeach-
ing the lead witness against George McFarland with the fact that the
witness who identified McFarland had described a completely differ-
ent person to the police after the crime.4" And it would be funny,
expect for the fact that George McFarland is not the only person sen-
tenced to death in Houston, the capital of capital punishment, where
his defense lawyer slept during trial. It happens with some frequency
in Houston, apparently.
Both Calvin Burdine and Carl Johnson, like many other people in
Texas, had the misfortune to be assigned Joe Frank Cannon. They
did not hire Mr. Cannon. They got assigned Mr. Cannon, the lawyer
who has a well-deserved reputation for trying cases like greased light-
ening, who does not file motions or make objections. When asked
why he did not have but three pages of notes on Calvin Burdine's trial,
40. 928 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 505-06 (holding that the defendant could not demonstrate that his counsel's
sleeping caused prejudice because the defendant "had two attorneys" and "was never with-
out counsel").
42. See id. at 505 n.5 ("We might also view [co-counsel] Melamed's decision to allow
[lead counsel] Benn to sleep as a strategic move on his part. At the new trial hearing,
Melamed stated that he believed that the jury might have sympathy for [McFarland] be-
cause of Benn's 'naps.'").
43. The source of this statement is unclear. For a description of each counsel's prepa-
ration for McFarland's trial, see id. at 500-03.
44. See id. at 506 (noting McFarland's contention that the identifying witness's in court
testimony varied from the description that she gave to the police, but replying that McFar-
land "misinterprets the testimony" because "the subject matter of the State's questioning
was different in the instances cited us by [McFarland]," so that "[n]o discrepancy occurred
in the testimony with which Benn could impeach [the witness]").
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he said, "Well, I don't take a lot of notes." Although there was undis-
puted testimony that he slept during both of those trials, that fact does
not violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. You can read Ex
parte Burdine,45 but you will not be able to read Carl Johnson's case
because neither the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals nor the Fifth
Circuit published its opinion. I don't blame them. I would be
ashamed to publish such an opinion. I am amazed, really, that the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had the courage to publish the Mc-
Farland and the Burdine cases, and the dissents that Judge Baird and
Judge Overstreet wrote, describing the quality of legal representation
in those cases.4 6 But Carl Johnson's case was too far beyond the pale,
and neither court published its opinion before Carl Johnson was put
to death by the state of Texas.
There is no public defender in Houston. The lawyers are as-
signed by the judges there. In so many of the states, and in all kinds
of cases, not just death penalty cases, and not just in Georgia, Ala-
bama, Texas, Mississippi, Arkansas-the death-belt of our country-
there is no Public Defender System. Just recently both Arkansas and
Mississippi decided to set up such a system, but so far they have not
funded it. In many counties throughout the country today the indi-
gent defense work is assigned on the basis of the lowest bid. We re-
cently did a study of the low bidder in one county in Georgia and
found that, during the four years that he had had the contract and
processed literally hundreds of cases, he tried only one case to a jury;
that in four years he filed only three motions; and (after we went to
court to see how this happened) that most of the time he met his
clients in open court and after a few whispered conversations entered
a plea of guilty.
There are other examples: Wallace Fugate47 was represented by a
lawyer who never had heard of Gregg v. Georgia,48 or Furman v. Geor-
45. 901 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc) (Maloney, J., dissenting from unpub-
lished denial of application for writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the court had a
duty to consider the issue whether counsel's sleeping during the trial violated the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel) (Baird, Overstreet, JJ., joining).
46. See id. Mr. Bright appears to be referring to Judge Maloney's dissent, joined by
Judges Baird and Overstreet, from the decision not to grant a writ of habeas corpus in Ex
parte Burdine, because there is a concurring, but no dissenting opinion, in McFarland It
appears, however, that the en banc majority decision in Burdine is unpublished.
47. As he explains infra, Mr. Bright is referring to one of his clients. All references to
the facts of cases in which Mr. Bright acted as an attorney rest on his authority.
48. 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that, although the death pen-
alty can violate the Eighth Amendment as applied, "the punishment of death does not
invariably violate the constitution").
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gia,49 or any other case for that matter. The last client of mine exe-
cuted, Larry Heath, was represented by a lawyer whose brief to the
Alabama Supreme Court was one page long, and cited only one case,
which went against his position. The lawyer cared so little about his
client that he did not show up for oral argument. Yet the Alabama
Supreme Court-and I will always wonder how that court could de-
cide a case based on a one page brief and a lawyer who does not even
show up for oral argument-affirmed the case. You would think that
the judges would have said to themselves, "To do our job as a court,
we have got to have a brief here, we have to have a real lawyer on this
case." But they did not say that, and Larry was put to death.5 °
There are many results of this sort in all kinds of cases, in terms of
who goes to jail, who doesn't, who gets probation, and who doesn't.
We know that there are now seventy-seven people who have been re-
leased from death rows who were innocent, and we know that often
those people have been released, not because of anything that the
legal system or the lawyers appointed to represent these individuals
has brought out. For example, in Illinois just recently we now for the
second time have had the journalism class at Northwestern prove that
somebody was innocent. But it is not just innocence. Obviously it is
important not to put innocent people to death, not to put innocent
people in prison for long periods of time. But today when we incar-
cerate almost two million people, our courts are making lots of impor-
tant decisions besides guilt or innocence. They are making decisions
about probation or jail; they are deciding about whether somebody
gets weeks in jail or months in jail, whether months in jail or years,
whether they get life without parole, or whether they get death.
The Atlanta paper just recently did a study that shows that if you
are white in Georgia you are thirty to sixty times more likely to be put
on probation, even if you have a worse record, than if you are a per-
son of color.51 Sentencing is probably the most important decision
the criminal justice system is making, because when a white judge is
49. 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that, in light of the statutory sen-
tencing schemes used in the capital cases before the Court, the imposition of the death
penalty in those cases violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment).
50. See Ex parte Heath, 455 So. 2d 905, 906 (Ala. 1984) (affirming conviction in Ala-
bama of defendant who hired men to kill his wife there, even though defendant was also
convicted of murder in Georgia, where the body was left, on the ground that the two
convictions presented no doublejeopardy issue); see also Heath v. State, 536 So. 2d 142, 144
(Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (affirming lower court's denial of writ of coram nobis that sought
to challenge Heath's conviction).
51. Bill Rankin, Unequal Justice: Whites More Apt to Get Probation, ATANTA J.-ATLANTA
CONST., Feb. 8, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 3679348.
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sitting there, without any information from the lawyers who have been
assigned to those cases, about to make that sentencing decision, and
that unconscious racism is coming into play-they see that white kid
as a troubled youth who needs help, but the black youth as a thug that
ought to be put away-nobody is providing that judge with any infor-
mation about a drug program, or an alcohol program, or a work pro-
gram, or something that could be done to divert that person. The
one who goes to jail may lose all contact with his family and his com-
munity and ruin his life, while the one on probation may go into that
drug program or the alcohol program and live a useful and produc-
tive life.
What is so troubling to me is that in the part of the country that I
practice in, the deep south, in most cases in which people are sen-
tenced to death today, no competent attorney, no journalist, no jour-
nalism class, ever reviews that case before that person is put to death.
As to people who are not put to death, I am often told about Walter
McMillian, whom Bryan Stevenson freed after eight years on death
row in Alabama.52 It is interesting, the irony of that case. Walter
McMillian was convicted of a crime that he did not commit. He was in
the next county when the crime was committed. The jury in that case,
probably in part because they had a doubt about his guilt, sentenced
him to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. He had what
seemed like the misfortune, but in hindsight turns out to have been
the good fortune, of being before judge Robert E. Lee Key, one of the
all-time great racist judges in Alabama history. Judge Key just could
not resist overriding the jury's verdict of life imprisonment without
parole and imposing the death penalty. It is only because Walter
McMillian was under death sentence that our office, and Bryan Ste-
venson, got involved in this case. If the judge had just left the verdict
alone, at life imprisonment without parole, then McMillian never,
ever, would have had a lawyer. There are no lawyers for people sen-
tenced to life imprisonment without parole in Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Mississippi, Texas, and these other states. There is no lawyer
for the person convicted of burglary, or anything else, who is rotting
away in a prison, and Walter McMillian would have rotted away in one
of Alabama's prisons until the day he died. The only reason that he is
free today is because he got sentenced to death.
52. See McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933, 946-49 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (reversing
defendant's conviction, after prosecution's leading witness recanted his testimony, on the
ground that the State had failed to turn over exculpatory evidence that would have cast
doubt on that witness's testimony).
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Well, I was asked to talk about not how bad the situation is, but
why it is that way. Why haven't we done better?-that was the question
that Doug Colbert asked me to address. The first reason that I want to
suggest for you to think about-see if you can help me with this, be-
cause I give it to my class every year-is this: How do you enforce the
right to counsel? We count upon a lawyer to enforce all of our rights
for us. When you have a lawyer who does not know any law, however,
the lawyer obviously cannot enforce your rights. If you have a lawyer
who never heard of Gregg v. Georgia,5" or Furman v. Georgia,54 never
heard of anything, like my client Wallace Fugate had, then obviously
the lawyer is not going to make any objections because he does not
know any law. He does not challenge the under-representation of Af-
rican-Americans in the jury pool, because he does not know that they
have to be represented.5 5 Of course, the lawyer also must marshal the
facts and the evidence and bring all the evidence to bear, bring it into
court so that the court has it. But who enforces the right to counsel?
Let me give you an actual case and let us think it through. Greg-
ory Wilson, an African-American man facing the death penalty in Cov-
ington, Kentucky, was from Detroit.5 6 He has no family in Kentucky,
he has nothing. At that time, Kentucky paid the pricey sum of $2500
to represent someone in a capital case; like many states still do today,
Kentucky has a flat cap on how much a defense lawyer can receive.
The judge who had that case, for some reason, could not find any
member of the Bar who wanted to represent Gregory for $2500. The
judge tried a somewhat creative approach. (I am not saying many
judges do this; I really am asking about how you enforce the right to
counsel). Judge Lape put a sign on the courthouse door that said,
"Desperate, please help." Underneath these words, the sign said that
he had a death penalty case, that it only pays $2500, that he needed a
53. 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that, although the death pen-
alty can violate the Eighth Amendment as applied, "the punishment of death does not
invariably violate the constitution").
54. 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that, in light of the statutory sen-
tencing schemes used in the capital cases before the Court, the imposition of the death
penalty in those cases violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment).
55. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990) (stating that the Sixth Amendment
imposes a "fair-cross-section venire requirement"); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95
(1986) (prohibiting "purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire").
56. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Ky. 1998) (rejecting Wilson's
post-conviction claim that "he was forced either to represent himself or to be represented
by unprepared and incompetent [appointed] counsel"). More facts about the counsel and
their representation in this case are set forth in the direct appeal, Wilson v. Commonwealth,
836 S.W.2d 872 (Ky. 1992).
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lawyer to come forward and represent this man.. The sign asked if
anybody would volunteer. Two people did: Mr. Hagedorn and Mr.
Foote. Mr. Foote never tried a case before, and Mr. Hagedorn was the
lawyer who should never try another case. Here is what happened
with Gregory Wilson.
He got concerned with the legal representation that he had, and
I think you will agree with me that his concerns were somewhat legiti-
mate. When he first found out that Mr. Hagedorn didn't have an
office, that bothered him a little bit. Now, there might be people who
practice out of their home, particularly today with computers. But the
flashing Budweiser beer sign over the desk where Mr. Hagedorn
worked was a worry when Gregory Wilson heard about that. When he
heard also that the police had executed a warrant there not long
before, and had taken up the floor boards in the living room of Mr.
Hagedorn's house, taking out bags of stolen property, is when he re-
ally began to be really concerned. I think most of us, if we were a
consumer of legal services, e.g., if you were just going to a lawyer to
get him to do a will for you, and you found that that person was prac-
ticing out of his house with a flashing Budweiser beer sign, with police
raiding the house from time to time, you would probably say, "I think
I will get this will done somewhere else. No hard feelings, but I want
to go to one of those places where they have a lot of mahogany and a
lot of law books and they look like they are serious about the practice
of law, as opposed to this place."
But I think what Gregory Wilson was most concerned about was
when he called the telephone number that Mr. Hagedorn had given
him, and received the answer, "Kelly's Cave," a bar in Covington. It
actually worked pretty well because the bartender always would sum-
mons Mr. Hagedorn to the phone and one could talk to him. None-
theless, when Gregory Wilson next got to court, he told the judge, "I
want a lawyer. I want a real lawyer. I want a lawyer who is capable of
defending me in a death penalty case."5 7
The judge said, "Mr. Wilson, if you come up with a lawyer, be my
guest. This is your court-appointed lawyer; this is the lawyer whom
I'm giving you. If you can find somebody else who will take your case,
you are welcome to have him, but this is the lawyer whom the court is
giving you." Repeatedly, every time there was a motions hearing-and
there were not many, because Mr. Hagedorn did not file any motions,
although the court would have status hearings-Gregory Wilson
57. The quotation is Mr. Bright's paraphrase. For the actual on-the-record colloquy
between the trial judge and Wilson, see Wilson, 836 S.W.2d at 883.
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would object. He would say, "I don't want this guy. I want a lawyer; I
want a real lawyer to represent me." At the start of trial, even during
trial, he kept saying, 'Judge, I want a lawyer to represent me."
The trial was somewhat of a mockery of justice-I've read the
whole transcript. It is one of the few trials I have ever seen where
somebody, without having seen the direct examination, conducted a
cross examination of a witness. It is always good to see the direct ex-
amination before you do the cross, just to know what the witness has
said. Mr. Hagedorn was in the hall during the direct examination, but
nevertheless he cross examined the witness.
The Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the conviction, both on di-
rect appeal and post-conviction review.58 In fact, the court went so far
as to say that Gregory Wilson was partly at fault because he did not
cooperate with his lawyers.59 But what more could Gregory Wilson
have done to enforce the most fundamental right that a poor person
accused of a crime has?
Most people do not know any better. Most people do not know
that they have a right to somebody better than a guy who tries cases
like greased lightning. Some people do not know that "dream team"
means a lawyer who is asleep beside you. Most people do not chal-
lenge their lawyer because, first of all, they do not want to alienate
their lawyer, which certainly is what Gregory Wilson did. They also do
not want to run the risk that they will get an even worse lawyer from
the judge the next time.
"But," you say, "that is pre-trial." But the way in which one en-
forces the right to counsel is by bringing a claim of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel after the fact, after the person has been sentenced.
Then, however, we return to the problem that I mentioned a moment
ago. For most people there is no right to counsel in post-conviction
proceedings,60 so that they have no way to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. It is very hard for a person with an I.Q. of eighty
or eighty-five, or somebody who has only been through fifth grade, to
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Of course, if you end
up with a lawyer who is even worse then the lawyer you had before, it
is awfully hard to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
58. See supra note 56 (citing both cases).
59. See Wilson, 836 S.W.2d at 879 (stating that "Wilson's own actions [including re-
jecting the advice of Hagedorn and Foote] severely hampered the efforts of counsel to
assist him").
60. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) ("We have never held that
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon
their convictions, and we decline to so hold today." (citation omitted)).
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Exzavious Gibson, in Georgia, filed his post-conviction pleading
by using a fill in the blank form that all of the guys on the row file
because the statute of limitation is running, and they do not have law-
yers. 6 ' (This is the first time in history that Congress has imposed a
statute of limitations on habeas corpus and at the same time defunded
the programs that were providing legal representation for people.62
Quite a one two punch.) The judge who got Exzavious Gibson's case
set it for a prompt hearing.6" When the case came up for hearing, the
judge asked, "Are you ready to go, Mr. Gibson?" Mr. Gibson said,
"Well, I need a lawyer." The judge replied, "You are not entitled to a
lawyer."
Gibson is a man with an I.Q. in the 80s. He is completely disori-
ented and befuddled by this process; he cannot imagine what the
judge is talking about. The judge said, 'You can put on a case." Gib-
son said, "I don't know how to put on a case." The judge said, "Well,
you can call witnesses." Gibson: "I don't know who to call." The
judge: "Well sit down."
The Warden, by contrast, was not representing himself at this
hearing. He was represented by an expert, an attorney from the At-
torney General's office who specializes in nothing but capital habeas
cases.
In Gibson v. Turpin, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the con-
viction, and held that there is no right to counsel, even for a defend-
ant's first state post-conviction hearing.' The court said that, under
Murray v. Giarratano,6 5 the Supreme Court decision that there is not a
right to counsel in habeas corpus, Exzavious Gibson could not success-
fully raise the issue that he had been denied his right to counsel.
As someone said during this last panel, in the case of Murray v.
Giarratano, Justice Rehnquist said that Virginia can decide to concen-
trate its resources at the front end of the processes. Instead of provid-
ing money for lawyers to represent people in the post-conviction
stages of review, Virginia can make the decision to put the money at
61. See Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 189 (Ga. 1999) (holding that death-row in-
mates do not have a constitutional right to counsel in petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (Supp. 1999).
63. The reported opinion states that Gibson had an I.Q. in the 80s and an eighth grade
education. See, respectively, Gibson, 513 S.E.2d at 193; id. at 195 (Fletcher, P.J., dissent-
ing). The opinion does not, however, provide any facts relative to the post-conviction hear-
ing. Mr. Bright's paraphrase of the colloquy at the hearing rests on his own authority.
64. See Gibson, 513 S.E.2d at 189.
65. 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating that there is no right to counsel
in post-conviction proceedings, even in capital cases).
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trial where it will make a difference.66 I do not know whether the
Chief Justice did not know, but at the time that he wrote those words
Virginia spent less then any other state in the country for lawyers for
defendants facing the death penalty at trial, less then $1000 a case.
The compensation still is near the bottom today.67 So Virginia had
decided not to spend its money at either end of the system, even in
capital cases, but instead to spend its money on memorials to the Con-
federate War dead.
Some people in Texas would be better off probably representing
themselves. I am delighted that Chief Judge McCormick of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has joined this Symposium, because I do
not think that there is any state in the union that has failed more
miserably with regard to Gideon than the state of Texas. I do not think
that there is any court in the country that has made a bigger mockery
out of the right to counsel than the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
I do not think that there is any court that has done a worse job of
appointing lawyers for people than the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals. My students so often ask me, "How is it that judges do this?" I
think some of you might be interested in knowing the answers.
What about Ricky Kerr.' a He was assigned a lawyer who was just
four years out of school, had only been in practice three years, and
had no experience in death penalty cases, even as second chair. The
lawyer was too ill even to go to his office during the month before
Kerr's petition was to be filed. Believe it or not, the lawyer did not
even know that in a post-conviction application for habeas corpus, one
can challenge the conviction and the sentence-that is the whole pur-
pose of a post-conviction proceeding. So he filed a nonsensical plead-
ing that challenged the constitutionality of the Texas post-conviction
statue. The court denied that petition, despite the court's statutory
responsibility to appoint competent counsel in post-conviction cases.
66. See id. at 11 ("Virginia may quite sensibly decide to concentrate the resources it
devotes to providing attorneys for capital defendants at the trial and appellate stages of a
capital proceeding. Capable lawyering there would mean fewer colorable claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel to be litigated on collateral attack.").
67. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (Michie Supp. 1999) (compensating, after July 1,
1999, appointed counsel $845 for representing indigent defendants accused of a felony
punishable by 20 years or more confinement, $318 for all other felonies, and "an amount
deemed reasonable by the court" for capital cases).
68. See Ex parte Kerr, 977 S.W.2d 585, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Overstreet, J., dis-
senting) (dissenting from denial of writ of habeas corpus application because defendant's
attorney, having failed to challenge the trial and sentence on original application, was
constitutionally ineffective).
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Judge Overstreet dissented, saying that the court "would have blood
on its hands" if this person is put to death.69
The second reason, in addition to the difficulty of enforcing the
right to counsel, that the situation is so bad is, obviously, money. In so
many states the amount of money that a lawyer makes for represent-
ing someone in any kind of criminal case, if that lawyer really spends
the time that is required to do the job, will be less than the minimum
wage: Mississippi, $1000;7o Alabama, a limit of $2000 for time spent
out of court7 1 -so that if you spend $500 getting ready for a capital
trial, you will get paid four dollars per hour. And the old adage is true
that you get what you pay for, as the Fifth Circuit said in one case that
it reversed in Texas. 72 Fred Macias was freed, because he did not hap-
pen to get a lawyer like Ricky Lee Kerr or some of the other defend-
ants whom I have described got. He was really fortunate that a lawyer
from Skadden Arps volunteered to represent him and proved that he
was innocent. When the Fifth Circuit reversed that case, it noted that
the State of Texas paid $11.84 per hour, and that "the justice system
got only what it paid for."7' But it is a rare case where we actually
recognize that the limited amount of money that we pay has that di-
rect an influence on the quality of representation that people receive.
The third reason that the current situation is so bad is that the
lawyers appointed to cases so often are not independent of the judges.
For example, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Georgia did away with the whole Public Defenders Office be-
cause they did not like what was going on there. 74 As I said a moment
earlier, my students always ask me when we study these cases, when we
69. Id.
70. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-17 (1972) (limiting compensation for appointed coun-
sel to $1000 per case, and, in capital cases in which two attorneys may be appointed,
$2000).
71. See ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(d) (1995) (limiting compensation to $1000 per case, ex-
cept in capital cases, where the limit is $1000 plus payment for all in-court work at the rate
of $40 per hour).
72. See Martizen-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming
the grant of writ of habeas corpus because defendant "was denied his constitutional right
to adequate counsel in a capital case in which actual innocence was a close question").
73. Id. at 1067.
74. The editors could find no reference to such an action. The media in Atlanta, how-
ever, have reported on a case, filed in 1994 in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia by former inmate and defendant Sam Stinson against the
Fulton County commissioners and the Fulton County Public Defender's Office. See Alfred
Chambers, Fulton Commissioners Are Ordered into Court, ATLANTA J.-ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 30,
1999, at C4, available in 1999 WL 3766977. The lawsuit alleges that poor defendants wait in
jail for months before seeing a public defender, in part because Fulton County does not
adequately fund the Public Defender's Office.
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study McFarland,75 when we study Kerr',7 6 "How can a judge preside
over a case where a lawyer was sleeping, or drunk-a judge who has
taken an oath to uphold the Sixth Amendment as well as the rest of
the Constitution?" It is very hard to explain that, not only do judges
tolerate such representation, but also that the judges appointed those
lawyers. Joe Frank Cannon has been appointed for the last forty-five
years by judges in Houston to represent people. These judges know
what kind of lawyer he is. They know that they would never ask Joe
Frank Cannon to represent one of their children in a traffic matter, or
anything else. But these defendants are so unworthy, are clearly so
guilty, that we will just give them Joe Frank Cannon and let it go at
that. It is hard to explain to law students the culture that has devel-
oped in our court system, the belief that we are doing the best we can
for poor people with the money we are paying, and that these kinds of
lawyers are just all the poor are going to get.
Of course, the larger problem is that judges are not independent.
Judges in most of our states are elected, and elected judges cannot be
soft on crime in today's world. In fact, Judge Baird just recently lost
his bid for re-election.
77
I don't mean to pick on Texas, but it provides so many good ex-
amples. A few years ago, when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed a case, the chairman of the Republican party called upon the
voters to have the Republican party take over the court. In the last six
years, this has happened: The court has gone from a one hundred
percent Democrat court to a one hundred percent Republican court,
with Judge McCormick changing parties from Democrat to Republi-
can during that process.78 One of the people who led the charge was
Steven Mansfield. Before the election it came out that Mansfield, to
put it most charitably, is a pathological liar. He said that he was born
in Texas, turned out it was Massachusetts; he said that he never had
run for office before; he had run for Congress in New Hampshire. In
75. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (per
curiam).
76. Ex parte Kerr, 977 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Overstreet, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from denial of writ of habeas corpus).
77. Bruce Nichols, GOP Candidates Sweep 3 Seats, Appeals Court Will Be AU-Republican for
the First Time, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 4, 1998, at 35A, available in 1998 WL 13115456
(explaining that Democratic incumbentJudge Charlie Baird lost his bid for re-election to a
Republican).
78. Id. (noting that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was unanimously Democratic
as recently as 1992); see San Attlesey, GOP Welcomes Party Switchers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 7, 1997, at 17A, available in 1997 VL 11526058 (reporting that the presiding judge of
the Court of Criminal Appeals, Michael McCormick, announced his "conversion" to the
GOP).
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fact, he had even been fined for practicing law without a license in
Florida. 79 Even though these facts became public, he got fifty-six per-
cent of the votes. He is now Judge Mansfield. Texas Lawyer wrote an
article after he got elected and said that he was an unqualified suc-
cess-it is the truth.8" Last December he got arrested for scalping the
complimentary football tickets that the judges get at the University of
Texas football games. Someone wrote an interesting article advising
Judge Mansfield of what kind of problems he would have, now that he
was a criminal defendant, due to some of the opinions that he himself
had written. But that is one of the judges on the court that reviews
every capital case on direct appeal and every capital case on post-con-
viction, decides what Strickland vs. Washington81 means, and decides
about the appointment of counsel for people.
That brings me to another reason that we have the scandalous
quality of legal representation in our courts. The Strickland standard
has made a mockery of the right to counsel. The poor person who is
represented by a lawyer not only has to prove the deficient perform-
ance of that lawyer, which is impossible to prove if you do not have a
lawyer, but also that the lawyer's performance was so deficient that it
affected the outcome of the trial.8 2 Justice O'Connor argued that the
reason we are putting the burden of proof on the defendant to prove
this deficiency is that the government is not responsible for the errors
that the defense lawyer makes.8" But in all the cases that I have had
the government is responsible. Every one of my clients got their law-
yer from the government; they did not ask for these lawyers. Gregory
Wilson did not ask for his lawyer. Wallace Fugate did not ask for his
lawyer. Nobody, as far as I know, ever has asked for Joe Frank
Cannon.
79. See Jack Douglas, Jr., Appeals Court Krill Have First Woman, FT. WORTH STAR-TELE-
GRAM, Nov. 9, 1994, at 18, available in 1994 WL 4031508 (reporting that Judge Mansfield
paid a $100 fine in 1986 for practicing law in Florida without a license); Clay Robinson,
Board Won't Act on Mansfield, HOUSTON CHRON., June 28, 1995, at 17, available in 1995 WL
5912519 (noting that Judge Mansfield ran for Congress twice in New Hampshire).
80. See, e.g., John Sirman, Texas Court of Ciminal Appeals Judge Stephen Mansfield, 62 TEx.
B.J. 686 (1999) (noting the controversy surrounding Judge Mansfield and the fact that he
was "arrest[ed] for hawking a complimentary pair of football tickets on the University of
Texas campus").
81. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
82. See id. at 687-96 (setting forth criteria for determining a constitutionally deficient
performance by counsel).
83. See id. at 693 ("[A]ctual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney per-
formance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prej-
udice. The government is not responsible, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors
that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence.").
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I think that the law schools also have to take some responsibility.
We have to ask why it is that we turn out people who are more pre-
pared to be associates at law firms than people who want to defend life
and liberty. I know that there is no money out there for such defense
work, and that that is a big factor. But I do think that clinics-like
Doug Colbert has here, like Harvard has with the Criminal Practice
Institute, like Georgetown, and like NYU with its many clinics-are
essential if we ever are going to change things.
I think also that we have to realize that this "war on crime" that
we are fighting is responsible for the situation. There is a notion that
some people among us are so unworthy, that they are not entitled to
counsel, that they are not entitled to protection of the Bill of Rights,
that they are not entitled to anything. You hear the Bill of Rights
routinely denigrated as nothing but a collection of technicalities. We
had a judge on the Fourth Circuit talking about dotting the "I's" and
crossing the "T's," as if that is all that the Bill of Rights is.84 You see
people coming here from around the world, trying now that commu-
nism is no longer part of their country, to get a Bill of Rights, trying to
get habeas corpus, while we are denigrating and eliminating these
protections for our own people. Hugo Black, when he was on the
Supreme Court, said that our courts should "stand against any winds
that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer
because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are
non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement."85 But
today the despised are so despised that they do not even get a lawyer
at all, or lawyers so bad that the latter are literally walking violations of
the Sixth Amendment. If things continue, we will have to acknowl-
edge that our courts are not havens of refuge, but are more like the
soldiers who come to the battlefield after the war and shoot the
wounded. If that is our situation, then we seriously have to consider
whether we should sandblast the words "Equal Justice Under Law" off
the Supreme Court Building. Perhaps we simply should say that our
courts are just like the country clubs and the sky boxes at the stadium
which the government paid for-they are just for the wealthy. If you
are Charles Keating, then no problem: You can bring your lawyer into
court, you can get habeas relief, and Charles Keating did.86 If you are
Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, then you can have the former Attorney
84. See United States v. Williamston, 14 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (unpub-
lished opinion).
85. Chambers v. State, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
86. See Keating v. Hood, 191 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming district court's
grant of habeas relief).
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General of the United States represent you. But if you are George
McFarland, if you are Calvin Burdine, if you are Exzavious Gibson,
then you stand virtually alone at the bar of justice.
Some of my colleagues at Yale are a lot smarter than I am, and
they talk about whether we should have an adversary system, an inqui-
sitional system-it's way over my head. But I do know this: The worst
system we can possibly have is to pretend to have an adversary system
when we do not have one at all. That is what we are doing now in so
many places.
What do we do about it? I think that we have to change the dis-
cussion, to remind ourselves that we are talking about the most funda-
mental right of all, the most precious right of all, the right whose lack
of enforcement renders other rights meaningless. Every time I go to a
meeting in Georgia to talk about indigent defense, all we talk about is
how we can move the cases through the system quickly. It is all about
efficiency. It was a refreshing moment there when Harold Clarke was
the ChiefJudge, because it was the first time that I ever heard anybody
in one of those meetings actually ask, "Is it fair?" Not: "Will it move
the cases more quickly? Will we kill people more quickly? Will we
have fewer appeals?" It is a fundamental question: Is it fair to let
somebody be represented like this?
In the Gibson case, the Georgia Supreme Court, who no longer
has Justice Clarke, said that, if there were a right to counsel in post-
conviction proceedings, then the petitioner could claim that that
counsel was ineffective.87 In other words, petitioners would say that
they had a right to a good lawyer if we said that they had a right to a
lawyer-what Justice Brennan, when he was on the Supreme Court,
called the fear of too much justice.
I would like to take a moment or two to talk to the law students.
All of you are going to be in some position of leadership in your state
and in this country. I hope that one of the things you will do, in posi-
tions of leadership, is not make the suggestion that anyone who be-
lieves in fairness is soft on crime. I hope that anybody who graduates
from the University of Maryland Law School will not go out into this
world and suggest that the Bill of Rights, the most precious set of pro-
tections that we have, is nothing more than a collection of technicali-
ties. I hope that some of you will provide the kind of leadership that
was provided at the time Clarence Gideon's case was before the
87. See Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 191 (Ga. 1999) (stating that "if there is a
constitutional right to counsel upon state habeas corpus, an additional Sixth Amendment
claim will exist in Georgia: ineffective assistance of habeas counsel").
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Supreme Court. Florida asked Attorney Generals from all around the
country to argue its side, that poor people did not have a right to a
lawyer. Walter Mondale, later Vice President, then the Attorney Gen-
eral of Minnesota, Tom Eagleton, Attorney General McCormick in
Massachusetts, and a number of others said, "Yes, we are coming into
this case-but on Gideon's side." Twenty-two states filed amicus briefs
in support of Clearance Earl Gideon and the right of every poor per-
son accused of a crime to a lawyer."8 (Only two states, North Carolina
and Alabama, supported Florida's position). That is leadership.
When Robert Kennedy was the Attorney General of the United
States and Gideon was handed down, he went to Congress and got the
Criminal Justice Act passed.8 9 Robert Kennedy was not soft on
crime-he was a tough Attorney General-but he believed in fairness.
When the Death Penalty Resource Centers were representing people
and proving, for example in the case of Walter McMillian9" and
others, that people sentenced to death were actually innocent of their
charges, it was the National Association of Attorneys General that
went to Congress and urged Congress to de-fund those programs, and
thus to leave people facing the death penalty literally defenseless and
without counsel. That is not leadership. That is simply taking advan-
tage of people because of their poverty.
What do you do about it, those of you who are students, who look
at these problems, and think that the truth of the matter is, as we all
know, that the government is not going to fund a solution, the courts
are not going to order one, and we are going to be left where we are
today? My advice is that you have to do it yourself. When he won the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1986, Elie Wiesel said that our lives are not our
own, that they belong to those who need us desperately. I only have
started to discuss some of the desperate needs that people have. They
need lawyers who will represent them, not because there is money or
glory in doing so, and not for any other reason except that these peo-
ple desperately need legal counsel.
88. These states are listed in the opinion. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
89. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. 1999)).
90. See McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933, 946-49 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (reversing
defendant's conviction, after prosecution's leading witness recanted his testimony, on the
ground that the State had failed to turn over exculpatory evidence that would have cast
doubt on that wimess's testimony).
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Cornelius Singleton 9 spent eight years on death row in Alabama
without any lawyer ever coming to see him, just to explain to him
where his case was in the process. Billy Moore told my class about
how, when he was sentenced to death, they set a date for his execu-
tion, and when that day came every time the door opened in the cell
block he thought they were coming to kill him, because his lawyer
never bothered to tell him that the date was automatically stayed for
the automatic appeal. So he spent a whole day just thinking he was
going to be killed. What kind of legal representation is that? Just to
counsel people, just to explain to people what their rights are, just to
talk to people about the consequence of a guilty plea before they ac-
cept one. There is not any money in it, but I will tell you, as Oliver
Wendell Holmes said, there can be great deal of exhilaration in trying
your heart out in pursuit of the unattainable.
For a small number of you who graduate from law school-and
this is a notion we all have to get back to-you will find that law is a
calling, not just a job or even a profession. As for those in ministry,
some in teaching, and a few in medicine, you will find that law is a
calling to go out and help those most in need, and that it is not a
burden to represent poor people; it is a privilege. You will find that
there is absolutely nothing wrong with lawyers making the same kind
of salaries that teachers, and farmers, and police officers, and prison
guards, and other people make.
In this light, the real heroes in the legal profession, when it
comes to Gideon v. Wainwright, are the public defenders who, day in
and day out, in case after case, are in the courts with staggering
caseloads, inadequate resources, often no respect from the court and
certainly no appreciation. And the court-appointed lawyers who take
cases for small amounts of money, but who give those cases everything
that they are due because that is the right thing to do, and who work
hard, are also heroes. Because of them, some wrongfully accused peo-
ple are not convicted. Because of them some young people are di-
verted into alcohol programs, and into drug programs. Because of
them, some defendants understand what it is like to go through this
foreign land of the criminal justice system. To the small extent that
Gideon has been realized in our country, it is these public defenders
and hard-working court-appointed lawyers who have done so. They
also have shown, by the work they have done every day, that providing
lawyers to poor people accused of crimes is not beyond the grasp of
91. See Singleton v. Thigpen, 897 F.2d 668, 670 (rejecting Singleton's claims that he
had ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial).
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this very wealthy society. It is just a matter of reaching out and deliver-
ing on constitutional promises that we made a long time ago.
PROFESSOR DOUG COLBERT
It really is a pleasure for me to introduce our final keynote
speaker; it is clear to me that this is one of those individuals about
whom there may be a generation gap. The good news is that that
generation gap is soon to be overcome because, in a very short time,
Denzel Washington will be playing Rubin Hurricane Carter in a Nor-
man Jewison film; Rod Steiger will be playing the federal judge to
whom I am about to refer. I think that people of the younger genera-
tion will certainly come to know Rubin Hurricane Carter.
When I was growing up, I knew of Rubin, knew of Hurricane,
because he was the number one contender for the middle weight box-
ing champion of the world. In those days I used to watch boxing
matches, and I was incredibly impressed with his skills in the boxing
ring. I remember several fights quite clearly, even today, in which
Rubin knocked out the then champion Emile Griffith in sixty-nine
seconds into the first round. Rubin Carter was clearly a force, a pow-
erful force, and he remains that today, although he has taken on a
different fight, a different battle. When I was a college student, in
1966, we heard about the police charging Rubin Carter and John Ar-
tis, who is also present here today, with the most serious crime of hav-
ing committed murder against (I believe) three white people. I
couldn't believe it then, and I continued not to believe it as a law
student at Rutgers Law School. The crime itself occurred in New
Jersey, so many of us at Rutgers became involved in Rubin's case. Un-
fortunately, it took nineteen years, during which time Rubin was incar-
cerated, before a federal judge agreed and dismissed the conviction
against Rubin Hurricane Carter.92 The judge in that decision said
that Hurricane's conviction had been "predicated upon an appeal to
racism rather then reason, and concealment rather than disclosure."9"
Today Rubin Hurricane Carter lives with his family in Toronto,
Canada. He is the Executive Director of the Association in Defense of
the Wrongly Convicted, here in the United States, in Rubin's home
country of Canada, and in England. It is a great pleasure for me to
introduce him. Welcome Rubin Hurricane Carter.
92. Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 560 (D.N.J. 1985), affd in part, dismissed in part,
826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987).
93. Id. at 534.
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RuiN HuRRIANE CARTER
Thank you. Good afternoon everybody. Ladies and Gentlemen,
Professor Doug Colbert, Stephen Bright, honored guests, and friends,
it is truly, truly a great honor and privilege for me to be here at the
University of Maryland today. But when you come to think about it,
given my history, it's a great pleasure for me to be anywhere today. I
know that some people may be disappointed that Bryan Stevenson is
not here. Bryan couldn't make it for some reason, and so they called
in the second string. I hope you won't be disappointed.
But he who bemoans the lack of opportunity forgets that small
doors often open up into large rooms. So I want to take a moment
here and pause. For whom does the bell toll? It tolls for thee, my
friend, my brother, my love. I bow to you and I respect and accept
everything that you stand for, truth and righteousness. Ladies and
Gentlemen, we have in the audience with us this afternoon the one
and only person, the one and only reason why I am standing here
today, alive and well-other than the Creator, of course. John Arnold
Artis, for twenty years, literally, had the outcome of my life in the palm
of his hand to do with whatever he chose to do with it. I had no
choice in the matter whatsoever; only John and the Creator were call-
ing the shots, and I was simply a puppet. My life was not my own; it
belonged to John Artis. My innocence belonged to John Artis.
Do you know what a shitska is? "Shitska" is Russian for stool pig-
eon. John Artis is not a stool pigeon. If he were, I would have been
dead thirty-three years ago. In every case of wrongful conviction that I
have come across, a stool pigeon is always the main element of that
atrocity-a jailhouse stool pigeon, a jailhouse snitch trying to buy his
way out ofjail or simply trying to get some money without sticking the
gun to somebody's head. Wouldn't you agree with me, Stephen
[Bright], that stool pigeons are the most central ingredient to all
wrongful convictions. All John had to say was that Rubin Hurricane
Carter, that bald-headed loud-mouth prize fighter who hated every-
body, including himself, killed those people. And I would have been
dead. And John would have been free and alive to carry out his life as
he intended.
You see, I didn't know John Artis and John Artis didn't know me
when we were convicted of this crime. I was twenty-nine-years old and
John was nineteen years old. We didn't hang out together, or any-
thing like that. John was a church-going young boy; John had just
graduated from high school and was on athletic scholarship to go to
college. John was one of the best track people in the United States at
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that time. John never had any problems with the police, ever, ever,
before. He didn't know anything about the police.
Me-I was that loud-mouth prize fighter on television every week
getting my brains beaten out, or knocking somebody else's brains out,
and speaking about what was going on in the United States at that
time where people of African decent were segregated, where people
of African descent were riding in the backs of buses, where people of
African descent couldn't drink out of this water fountain, or couldn't
go to that school, or couldn't live in this neighborhood. Yes, the gov-
ernment wanted me because I was saying, "Protect yourself. Do not
allow anybody to hurt you; even if that person is wearing a blue uni-
form, he is still a criminal."
And if John Artis had snitched, he would have had a great life
ahead of him. But he didn't do that; he didn't snitch. Every time
someone asked John to make a deal, John responded by saying, "My
mother and father didn't teach me to lie; they taught me to tell the
truth." The government itself, the government of NewJersey, went to
prison, took John Artis out of prison, brought him home to Patterson,
New Jersey, sat him down in front of his mother and father, and prom-
ised him (six weeks before Christmas) that, if John would give a state-
ment that in any way inculpated me with this crime, then the
Governor of New Jersey would guarantee that John Artis would be
home for good before Christmas. That's what this whole deal was all
about-lying. John wouldn't do it. That is miraculous. Sitting in jail
for fifteen years where everybody all around him was giving up, giving
out, and giving over, John Artis had the courage, the integrity, the
tenacity, the honesty, and the fortitude, to say no: "My mother and
father didn't teach me to lie." And you know what John told me in
private while we were walking around the prison yard one day. John
said, "Rubin, if I thought that you really had something to do with
murdering those people, I would have told the police because I
wouldn't lie for you either." Now that's the truth; that's John Artis. I
am tickled pink that it was you who got busted with me, and not some-
body else who would have made a deal.
John is my chosen angel, chosen by the Creator. I don't think
there is another human being on this planet who could have with-
stood the tremendous horrors that we faced in prison together-the
degradation, the humiliation, the rampant violence- and not be-
come a shitska, not become a stool pigeon. For that alone, John, I
cherish you and will forever be in your debt, for maintaining strength
enough, courage enough, fortitude enough, honesty enough, and all
of those other good things to go the distance. Ladies and Gentleman
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I would like to introduce to you my hero. So that you will see what a
real hero looks like and never be fooled again, Ladies and Gentlemen,
please recognize my hero and his lovely wife, Mr. & Mrs. John Artis.
John please stand up for us; you too Dolly. Thank you.
There is another reason, beside John Artis, why I am here today.
If it had not been for a quaint Latin phrase, "habeas corpus," I am
afraid that I would have been a "No Show" here today due to a "prior
commitment." You see, the state of New Jersey had me booked for
something else.
In 1966, at the age of twenty-nine, I was at the peak of my ca-
reer-a professional prize fighter, about to fight for the champion-
ship of the world. The next thing I knew we were fighting for our very
lives, on trial in criminal court. We were accused of murdering three
people in a New Jersey bar. The state sought the death penalty; we
were facing the electric chair for a crime that we did not commit. The
odds of our being alive today were not exactly in our favor. There
were three murdered victims, all of them white. The jury was all
white. The judge, the police, the state's witnesses, and the prosecutor
were all white. We, at that time, were "black." But luckily-if you can
call the hell of a triple life sentence "luck"-because I was a somewhat
successful prize fighter and had the money to pay for first rate lawyers,
we escaped execution. But it was the quality of our legal representa-
tion that made the critical difference. It allowed us to remain alive.
Now, when Professor Colbert asked me to substitute for Bryan
Stevenson and to speak to you about Gideon v. Wainwright94 and the
right to counsel, I worried because it is absolutely impossible to speak
about the right to counsel without speaking first about habeas corpus,
politics, popular culture, and fear. A big topic with so little time. I
recently heard someone say that the law is just politics by other means.
Now, that's a rather cynical view ofjustice, but what is driving the cur-
rent push to clamp down on habeas corpus if not politics? And what
drives the politics, if not fear? We will get back to this question of fear
in a moment, but first let's deal with some myths of popular culture.
People, professionals and lay people alike, say and believe that
there are certain absolutes that will keep you from being sent to
prison. First of all, don't commit a crime. Now that is absolute, and
we all believe in that, right? Sure we do. Second, tell the truth. If you
have done nothing wrong, you have nothing to hide. Third, if you are
accused of a crime, get a good lawyer. Fourth, have a solid alibi sup-
ported by credible witness. Fifth, pass a lie detector test. Sixth, if you
94. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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don't have the motive, means, or opportunity to commit the crime in
question, you are home free. Right? Wrong!
We didn't have a motive, we didn't have the means, and we didn't
have the opportunity. Even though we did not remotely fit the de-
scription of the assailants; even though the two surviving victims did
not and could not identify us, and even though they said that it was
not us; even though we had a number of alibi witnesses placing us
elsewhere at the time of the crime; even though we passed lie detector
tests showing that we had no involvement; and even though we had
nothing to hide and testified voluntarily before the Grand Jury-we
were still convicted.
So what happened? Well, as cynical as it may sound, as cynical as
it may be, politics reared its ugly head. The prosecution, the State, is
out to win. Winning is how careers are advanced. Successful police
officers are promoted; successful prosecuting attorneys become
judges, and a successful judge is one who is seldom reversed on ap-
peal. Discovery rules notwithstanding, the State is not going to tell
you what they don't want you to know. So you are going to have to go
out and find it for yourself. Let me give you an example from our
case.
There was no motive offered at our first trial in 1967. No one,
not a living soul, had any kind of explanation at all as to why John
Artis and this Rubin Hurricane Carter would do such a thing. But
after the recantation of the state's two key shitska witnesses-them-
selves suspects in the crime-in our second trial nine years later, in
order to rehabilitate its case, the prosecution suddenly conjured up a
motive: racial hatred, racial revenge. The prosecutor said that we, my
co-defendant and I, committed this crime because we hated white
people. We invaded a white neighborhood and picked that bar in
particular because the bartender was a known racist who refused to
serve black people. The bar, the prosecutor proffered, was therefore
a natural target for racial revenge. That's what the prosecution prof-
fered and that's what the jury heard.
Now, in our own investigation, we discovered witnesses known to
the police, a black couple, who had been served by that same bar-
tender that very night, and even had a running account with him. We
also discovered that the bar in question was actually in a mixed neigh-
borhood, and that the bartender was in fact friendly to black people.
But still the prosecutor distorted and manipulated the facts. The
prosecutor started with the fact that the victims were white and the
assailants black. Then the prosecution began to concoct an elaborate
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fiction that played right into the jury's worst fears-Armageddon, race
riots.
Now, in the face of all of this, what do you as lawyers do? How do
you keep us alive, or out of jail? Well, you don't do it by being a
"defense" lawyer. You have to be an offensive lawyer, even it offends
the powers that be, because that is your job. If offending the powers
that be in any way disturbs or distresses you, then, putting it to you
very mildly, you had better find a different occupation, because law-
yering is not stress-free.
I'm sure that some of you, or maybe all of you, are familiar with
the late great Edward Bennett Williams. He was a giant in the legal
field. He is what we called a pawn broker; every President was his
client. I had the good fortune to know Mr. Williams before my incar-
ceration in 1966. Mr. Williams had tried to recruit me to play football
for the Washington Redskins, for $25,000 per year. That was good
money, but I was already making over $100,000 a year by myself. So I
said to Mr. Williams, 'You must be crazy, you can get hurt playing
football. I'll stick to a kinder, gentler occupation. I'll stick to boxing."
Throughout my twenty-two year legal nightmare, Mr. Williams, while
not on our legal team per se, never hesitated to give us advice when-
ever we asked for it. He gave it pro bono. The best time to get him
was always 8:30 in the morning. His secretary would promptly put my
call through, and Mr. Williams would always take the time to answer
any and all of my questions, which indeed were very many. But that
kind of access, that kind of care, that kind of attention, means more to
a prisoner than you can possibly imagine. That in spades is the whole
raison d'etre of a lawyer-to provide legal access, care, and attention to
those whom he or she represents, especially to those who find them-
selves on the bottom of the empowerment pile with nowhere else to
turn.
I am on the Board of Directors of the Southern Center for
Human Right in Atlanta, Georgia. We deal with death penalty cases in
the South on a daily basis, as Stephen Bright no doubt has told you. I
am also on the Board of Directors of the Alliance For Prison Justice in
Boston. We deal with medical cases and with brutality in the prison
system, because I lost my eye for the lack of basic medical attention
while I was in prison. John Artis contracted an incurable circulatory
disease, such that John's fingers and toes were amputated daily. No-
body ever leaves prison unscathed. I am also the Executive Director of
the Association in the Defense of the Wrongly Convicted, based in
Canada, Great Britain, and in the United States. I say that, not to toot
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my own horn (because my horn doesn't toot), but simply to make a
point.
The Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights, Stephen
Bright (and there he is sitting right here) is a young, white, southern
boy, and absolutely brilliant and with a beautiful heart. Stephen once
told me, "Rubin, only one heart can teach another heart what the
written word doesn't say." Stephen's heart has been teaching my own
heart ever, ever since. I love you Stephen. Now, Stephen Bright is a
great lawyer because Stephen doesn't hide his outrage; he allows him-
self to be outraged. He isn't complacent either. The first thing that
Stephen and his colleagues at the Southern Center do when repre-
senting a black defendant in the South is to make an immediate mo-
tion to have the Confederate Flag removed from the court room-get
that flag out of here, because it is a symbol defiant of Brown v. Board of
Education.9" It is a defiant cry that we will not educate all of our citi-
zens. Even if the motion is denied, as it so often is, Stephen and his
colleagues have sent out a strong message that this is not going to be
business as usual, and that anything less than equal justice will not be
tolerated and will be vigorously opposed.
You don't have to look far to find plenty to be outraged about.
This country, which considers itself the leader of the free world, is the
only western industrialized nation that insists upon maintaining the
anachronism of the death penalty. We don't even deny its racist appli-
cation; we even kill children and mentally retarded adults. It's not
hard to be outraged when you realize that in no other country does
the legal specialty of death-penalty litigation even exist. It's not hard
to be outraged when you hear that lawyers in Louisiana and Missis-
sippi representing indigent clients receive the ridiculous sum of
$1000, and that this is the maximum, no matter how intensive the
investigation, the preparation, or the trial.9 6 In Georgia, the fee is
even less.97 As I learned last night, in Virginia, for representing juve-
nile defendants lawyers are only given $200.98 It's not hard to be out-
raged when you look at the crazy politics of electing judges, and
95. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
96. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Rule 31 (1999) (requiring district indigent defender boards
to remit "reasonable" compensation to appointed counsel); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-17
(setting $1000 cap for noncapital cases, and allowing 2 attorneys, and a $2000 cap in capi-
tal cases).
97. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-61 (1999) (limiting to $250 the compensation allowed to
an attorney prosecuting a post-conviction appeal).
98. There does not seem to be a separate statute dealing with compensation for repre-
senting juvenile defendants. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (Michie 1999) (including juve-
nile defendants within the statutory scheme).
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District Attorneys whose sole livelihood depends upon satisfying a
vengeful, but poorly informed, electorate.
It's not hard to be outraged-so get outraged and wear your out-
rage proudly. Let it show to your client, to your adversary, to your
students, to the judge. It will make a hell of a difference in their atti-
tude. They will respect you for it; they may not like it, but they will
respect you for it. There is nothing more self defeating and more
disheartening* to a client than a tired, cynical, timid lawyer just going
through the motions. You need outrage. It will make you a more
effective lawyer; it will catapult you up to the very same level as a Ste-
phen Bright. It will give you the energy, the courage, and the strength
that you are going to need to persevere. The right kind of attitude
always produces the right kind of actions.
The first thing you have to do is to make a connection with your
client. Make sure, even if only in your own mind, that you too are not
dehumanizing your client, because let me tell you exactly what your
client feels like while being on trial in a capital case, or in any case for
that matter. Your client feels like he is contaminated, as if he has
some vile disease that must be eliminated before it infects others. He
feels like a non-person, like a thing. He feels like an object that every-
one is staring at, talking about, and arguing over, without ever ad-
dressing him directly. Your client does not understand the process.
He doesn't understand what's admissible and what isn't admissible,
and why it is not admissible. He doesn't understand why this question
is asked and not that one. Your client doesn't understand the lan-
guage. Everybody in the court room is speaking legalese, and he
doesn't speak it. He doesn't understand the people, because the peo-
ple come from another world. So he trusts no one, including you.
The only thing your client does understand is that his life hangs in
balance and that there is nothing that he can do about it. Your client
feels helpless, powerless to do anything, or to say anything, all with the
dread of violent death coming closer and closer as this tefifying ritual
plays itself out. Because that's what going to prison means-death.
Prison is the lowest level of existence that a human being can exist on
without being dead. That's how diabolical prison really is. So open
up the lines of communication to your client. Don't hold it against
your client if he is defensive, skeptical, or evasive, because more often
than not your client has already been abused by the system. You are
going to have to prove to him or to her that you are not there simply
to continue that abuse.
The next thing that you have to do-please, that you must do-is
to refuse to accept the prosecution's case at face value. Don't be satis-
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fled with merely rebutting the case, because you owe it to yourself and
to your client to conduct your own investigation, an investigation in-
dependent of the prosecution, and independent of the police. I guar-
antee you that in every case you will find something useful, whether it
goes to the charge, to guilt, or to sentencing. (Even if your investiga-
tion convinces you that there is no chance of success at trial, explain
that to your client and to his family.) This evidence must be uncov-
ered before trial, because appellate rules are being severely restricted,
and access to writ of habeas corpus is being limited, not only by the
United States Supreme Court, but also by Congress and the
President.99
The writ of habeas corpus, the federal check on abuses at state
court levels, the one life-affirming jewel in the crown of thorns that we
know as the criminal justice system, is being threatened with extinc-
tion. That is one more thing to get outraged about. The writ of
habeas corpus is not just a piece of paper, not just a quaint Latin
phrase; it was the key to my freedom, the only thing that rescued me
from dying in prison. This simple piece of paper, these few words-
"It is ordered that the petition of Rubin Carter for writ of habeas
corpus hereby is granted."-gave me back my life, and gave precious
hope to so many others. The great writ ladies and gentlemen is in-
deed something tangible. It is not abstract. It is the concrete right of
every man, women, and child, in this country. It is our birthright to
be free from arbitrary, capricious, unjust, unconstitutional judgement,
confinement, or execution. Now there are forces at work trying to
limit our access to it even further than they already have. Why don't
we realize that by taking away our access to habeas corpus we are be-
ing robbed of something as real as money and far more valuable?
Why aren't the burglar alarms sounding? Where are the cops when
you really need them, when our freedom account is being looted?
You, as lawyers, have an awesome responsibility, whether your cli-
ent is innocent or guilty. You can't afford to make a mistake. Your
clients can't afford for you to make a mistake because the penalty for
them is just too high. Criminal cases, and especially capital cases, are
not for the faint of heart. We just heard individuals talking about law-
yers who are assigned to capital cases becoming burned-out. Well,
they are. I am not trying to frighten you, but as they say on the street,
"This sh-t is real, homey."
99. See, e.g., Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321-66 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)
(Supp. 1999)).
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There is a rush to death in our society, a chilling climate of anti-
crime hysteria and fear. That is our real adversary here, fear. We
can't turn on our television sets or open up a newspaper without the
specter of violent crime entering our living rooms, and frightening us
to death. Fear is really at the heart of everything. Fear feeds
prejudices, inflames passion, but clouds judgement. When you fear
someone, anything is possible. You can then justify anything, psycho-
logically and legally, from slavery to segregation, to antisemitism, to
the McCarthy witch hunt. You can justify the erosion of constitutional
protections, and justify the wholesale application of the death penalty
against minorities, the poor, the disadvantaged, and the
disenfranchised.
Blinded by our fear of crime, we focus only on the symptom and
completely ignore the causes, the roots of crime-the poverty, illiter-
acy, unemployment, drugs, and, yes racism. Instead of extending op-
portunities to people, we punish them further. I count on my thumb
and my index finger the number of people from privileged back-
grounds that I have met during my two decades in the penitentiary:
zero. It is the people who are marginalized in our society who most
need our help because, overwhelmingly, they are the ones that we so
eagerly consign to our nation's prisons and death chambers, albeit
under the color of law.
So what can we do about it? Well, we can't do anything if we let
ourselves become overwhelmed, jaded, and cynical. Our attorneys-
Myron Beldock, Professor Leon Freedman, and Lewis Steel, all New
Yorkers-took up our case after we had long since run out of money.
They labored on our behalf for over ten years without any expectation
of ever being financially compensated. Mr. Beldock's office alone
booked 11,000 man hours, over $100,000 in out-of-pocket expenses,
and millions of dollars more in unbilled legal fees. They did it, they
say, because it was the right thing to do, and I am glad they did it.
They did it pro bono. They are the first to proclaim how much richer
they are for having done it. As Mr. Beldock likes to say, "Money is not
the only currency." He also likes to say-and I guess this is a lawyer's
joke-that people make counterfeit money, but in many more in-
stances, money makes counterfeit people. Now I know there is no
danger of monetary contamination happening when you are dealing
with capital cases, because most capital cases involve indigent clients.
So I commend you for earning so much of that other currency, and I
applaud you for your efforts, which all too often go unrecognized.
More often than not, the law is steady only as an abstraction. We for-
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get that human lives are critically affected by law, that human lives are
literally at stake.
You have the power to make a difference. You can save lives. Is
that important? "The petition for Rubin Carter for writ of habeas
corpus is hereby granted." It has been almost fourteen years now
since the Honorable H. Lee Sarokin penned his big, bold, beautiful
signature beneath these words. Fourteen years-I can still scarcely be-
lieve it. But without the tireless efforts and dedication of lawyers and
aspiring lawyers like yourselves, I wouldn't have this document now. I
sure as hell wouldn't be here in Maryland with you today alive and
free. Is your work important? I defy anyone to tell me that it isn't.
But then again, what does an old punch-drunk prize fighter like me
know? What I do know is that, in order to be successful, you are going
to need courage, you are going to need strength, you are going to
need sustenance, you are going to need energy to persevere, in order
to be successful. Therefore John [Artis] and [his wife] Dolly and I
would like to invite all of you out for dinner tonight-the treat's on
us, because you, and you, and you, are going to be the ingredients
upon which we feast. First, we will begin with our appetizer, which will
be a long life marinated in good health, but seasoned with moderate
wealth, and sauteed in a rich broth of a very satisfying family life, with
just a dash of rewarding progeny. Our main course will consist of a
succulent roast of freedom, and justice, braised in the clear sauce of
brotherhood, which has been carefully glazed and crystallized over an
open fire of human dignity, stuffed with prosperity, sprinkled with a
generous serving of peace and goodwill, and accompanied by a spar-
kling wine of love and friendship, drunken out of golden cups of
higher consciousness. For only happiness can be the wine that sharp-
ens the taste of the meal. And now for the piece de resistance: We
will have a warm and loving gel of understanding, which can only be
filled by the fruits of both knowledge and being, surrounded by the
sweet syrup of goodness, which always come from within. This, my
friends, will be topped with a soothing after dinner drink of good hab-
its, laden with success. Of course, in order to enjoy the suckling mor-
sel of success, we must also have a jigger of happiness, and laughter
will be our handmaiden who serves us. Ladies and gentlemen, dinner
is on the table. Let's get busy! Thank you.
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